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The state of affairs, problems, and possible solutions
At almost the same time, Croatia got a new parliament, a new government and a new president.  We would like
to help them all to succeed in grasping the complex questions of public sector economics. It is for this reason that,
on the foundation of our work and research to date, we have drawn up a text entitled: “Public Sector Economics -
The state of affairs, problems, and possible solutions”.
Although by very definition a newsletter should be short, this time, exceptionally, because of changes in society
that are so important, we are publishing a longer, integral text.  We hope that the views and possible solutions
stated will make their way to the public and to representatives of the public who are charged with making the key
decisions. We also hope that it will stimulate other experts to make their own views heard and contribute to a rea-
soned debate, to the launching of further research, and to better approaches to public sector economics.
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Summary
• The Croatian public sector needs to be different,
smaller and more efficient than hitherto. For this it
is essential to see the development of institutions
appropriate to a market economy, to have help in
the development of a new, competitive economic
structure and the application of broad-based in-
stead of selective measures of state intervention.
• Better management of public expenditure requires
reform of institutions, which means the consistent
application of existing laws related to the budget,
and the improvement of the work of the budgetary
institutions.
• It is essential to fix on the optimum degree of fis-
cal decentralisation in which, in addition to
authority to finance expenditure, greater authority
to raise revenue would be transferred to the local
authority level; alternatively, the amounts of sub-
sidies need to be increased.
• It is necessary to draw up an integrated strategy or
agenda of public investment containing a long-
term strategy of public investment with the key
participants in the process, with an explanation
how this plan fits into the national macroeco-
nomic policies, and the planned level of expendi-
ture per sector and the structure of expenditure
within sectors, sources of financing and so on.
• It is crucial to establish the government treasury
with a treasury book and a single treasury account,
within the Finance Ministry, and not as part of the
Payments Clearing Institute; this will make it pos-
sible to unite and control all national revenue and
expenditure.
• It is essential to improve fiscal transparency,
which means ensuring a functional classification
of extra-budgetary funds, including the privatisa-
tion fund, to improve public sector statistics, and
to bring the public corporations, agencies and
banks within the fold of the regular state budget.
• It is also crucial to ensure complete records about
the situation and structure of the public debt, to
cease borrowing on the basis of anticipated reve-
nue from the privatisation of state corporations, to
define public debt policy, to pass a public debt
law, and in particular to draw up a list of all state
guarantees and to define the criteria for the issuing
of any further guarantees.
• A basic recommendation to do with the taxation
system is that tax revenue should not be reduced
without state expenditure being first cut.
• The taxation system has to be neutral, meaning
that it cannot be allowed to have any effect on the
making of economic decisions; the tax base has to
be as broad as possible with as few as possible ex-
ceptions and privileges, and taxation policy must
not be allowed to be used for the implementation
of measures of state social, economic and devel-
opment policies.  This means that additional
privileges may not be introduced for given
branches of the economy, or regions or occupa-
tions; on the contrary, there should be a tendency
towards the abolition of all existing privileges.
• The principle of taxing consumption and not sav-
ings and investment should be retained.
• Proportionately to the success attained in reducing
government expenditure, the whole of the tax bur-
den should be reduced, the universal rate of VAT
reduced, contributions reduced, the amount of
personal allowances in the calculation of income
tax be re-examined, as should the justification of
levying excise on non-alcoholic drinks and small
capacity cars.
• Additional rates of VAT must not be introduced,
nor should the profits (corporation) tax be re-
duced, new taxation privileges must not be
brought in, additional rates of income tax should
not be introduced, nor should the excise duties on
petroleum derivatives, tobacco and alcohol be
changed.
• A quality tax administration is a prerequisite for
the successful implementation of the tax system.
Here it is necessary to take measures to reduce tax
evasion, to determine the administrative and com-
pliance costs of taxation, to pass a law about the
taxpayers' rights and a law about fiscal responsi-
bility restricting expenditure at all levels of gov-
ernment.
• To reduce the grey economy it is more important
to do away with the causes than to sanction the
consequences, and here the key institutional
sphere is the relation between the state and the
economy.  For this reason it is necessary to im-
prove the laws and regulations, strengthen the in-
dependence and competence of the courts, im-
prove the statistics, organisation, efficiency, pro-
fessionalism and cooperativeness of state bodies,
reduce the role of the state in the economy, ration-
alise public expenditure, improve the quality of
the public sector, carry out a reform of the pen-
sions system, make a break with paternalist capi-
talism, control the privatisation process and
strengthen democratic forms of control.
Improvements in the economics of the public
sector will not be achievable without a solution to
the problems of retirement and health insurance,
the welfare system and the national bureaucracy.
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Introduction
The Institute of Public Finance deals with economic
research and analysis concerning various forms of
economic, legal and institutional topics important for
the sound long-term economic development of the
Republic of Croatia.
The general stance of the Institute of Public Finance is
to keep discussions at a professional level and avoid
current political debate. However, in recent times the
economic situation has become so complex that we
have become more and more involved in discussions
about the duties and responsibilities of experts to-
wards the profession and the country.  We have de-
termined, then, that it is essential for us to take a hand
and to help to explicate some of the difficult questions
that the public in a democratic society ought to under-
stand.
Because of our committed and professional approach,
we hope that a reasoned and independent analysis of
important current economic questions will help to in-
form the public and the elected representatives of the
public about the effects and possible consequences of
alternative policies.  We are firmly of the opinion that
it is just as important to ask the right questions as to
give answers.  For this reason, in the text that follows,
we shall attempt to give as short as possible a review
of the state of affairs, of the problems, and of some
possible ways of solving some of the most important
questions of public sector economics.
In the first part we shall attempt to ask questions and
provide some answers about what the role of the state
in the Croatian economy should be.  We shall at the
same time say what kind of a socialist state we inher-
ited, and how a contemporary state should be created.
The situation in which the public and the private sec-
tor encounter creates ideal conditions for corruption to
flourish.  The Croatian public sector and Budget, be-
cause of their exceptional dimensions, are of particu-
lar importance in the economy and in society as a
whole.  In Part 2 we shall give an account of the
budgetary process and the fiscal institutions, the opti-
mum level of fiscal decentralisation, the budget at the
service of economic growth (of public investment),
and fiscal transparency.  Since corruption is a conse-
quence of discretionary decision-making and opaque
data and policies, it is of particular importance to step
up the transparency of the budgetary process.
In Part 3 we will speak of the public debt.  In the arti-
cle the concept of the public debt will be explained,
and the special problems of differentiating structural
and conjunctural budgetary deficit, state borrowing
and monetary policy, the political aspect of the public
debt, the problems of state guarantees, the situation
and structure of the public debt, and questions of re-
sponsibility.  Then come proposals and measures in
connection with public debt statistics, the sale of na-
tional assets, public debt and guarantee issue policies.
In Part 4 we shall analyse the basic questions of the
Croatian taxation system.  A short description of the
Croatian tax system is given, and certain changes re-
lating to the reduction of the overall tax burden are
discussed, as well as a reduction in the universal VAT
rate and the rate of contributions, the continuance of
the principle of taxing consumption and not saving
and investment, the retention of the existing rate of
corporation [profits] tax, the reduction of the number
of tax breaks and so on.  Because of the incessant de-
bates on the topic, a special section is devoted to an
explanation of why it is best to have a single-rate
VAT.  Since the implementation of the tax system
depends on the quality of the tax administration, a
separate section is devoted to the Croatian Tax Ad-
ministration.
The unofficial economy, particularly in countries with
undeveloped or weak democratic and regulatory in-
stitutions, is extremely dangerous.  The unofficial can
outpace the official economy, and entail such conse-
quences as corruption, lobbying, organised crime and
lawlessness, which can lead to further social, political
and finally economic retrogression.  Considering the
extent of the unofficial economy in Croatia and the
dangers that arise from it, in Part 5 the existing state
of affairs of this economy and the reasons for its ex-
istence are analysed; proposals for its suppression and
for possible research are offered.
Welfare transfers are one of the greatest problems of
Croatian public finances.  In Part 6, then, we describe
the basic problems and offer some possible proposals
and lines of research related to a reform of the pen-
sions system, for health insurance and the financing of
health care.
Most of the topics we write about in the following
pages are of equal importance, and many other topics
(the financing, for example, of science, education and
culture) that we will not here discuss in detail are also
important. The IPF, according to experience and
knowledge acquired in preceding ongoing research, is
particularly interested in certain aspects of the re-
search that seem to us particularly urgent.  These are
above all questions of the transparency of public sec-
tor economics, particularly of budgetary processes and
institutions, the unofficial economy, the tax burden,
and reforms of the pensions system.
The texts that follow do reflect the viewpoints and
idea that obtain in the IPF.  We hope that these
stances and ideas will manage make their way to the
public, and to its representatives who are charged with
making the key decisions.  We also hope that they will
encourage other people in the profession to put for-
ward their own views, and that this will thus contrib-
ute to a reasoned debate, to the starting of further re-
search and, finally, to better solutions being adopted
in the economics of the public sector.
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PART ONE
1.1 The role of the state in the Croatian economy
The socialist state inherited
Having broken away from Yugoslavia and started off
the transition process, Croatia found itself faced with
the complicated problems of having to create an inde-
pendent sovereign and contemporary state upon foun-
dations inherited from an inefficient socialist state of
the federal type.  Many of the functions of the state
from the previous system had to be changed, and at
the same time new institutions had to be created to in
order to set up a state appropriate to the market econ-
omy.  Croatia did a lot in the transformation of the
state, but it should also be pointed out that over 52%
of GDP is still allocated to public spending, and that
this proportion has been rising in recent years (see
Table 1).  That is why there is still such a long and
arduous route towards the construction of a different
kind of state and government: smaller in extent, and
with institutions the nature of which will, to as great
an extent as possible, support market processes.
Table 1: The size of the state in Croatia in % of GDP
1995 1996 1997 1998
Total expenditure of the general consolidated state 48.9 50.7 49.4 52.1
Source: Annual Report of the Ministry of Finance for 1998
As stated above, in contemporary economics literature
it is generally considered that the macroeconomic sta-
bility and openness of a country are necessary, but not
the sufficient, conditions to build a market economy,
ensure sustainable growth, and thus attain a high de-
gree of prosperity among the population.  It is also
necessary to adjust governmental institutions to mar-
ket conditions.  As well as having to address its fun-
damental tasks in the fields of the protection of prop-
erty rights, basic education, health care, the infra-
structure, the maintenance of law and order, the state
plays a key role in the politics of regulation, social
protection and structural reforms.  The state needs to
be smaller as a whole, while in certain segments it
needs to be different, thus adjusting its functions to
the needs of the market economy. The fundamental
principle and basic point of departure in the reform of
government needs to be that the state needs not take
on those matters that the market does better, but
should step in where the market falls down. To as
great an extent as possible the state has to retire from
any entrepreneurial role, and create by its measures an
environment for the continued development of private
firms prepared to innovate and to take on commercial
risks.
The creation of a contemporary state
In order to achieve the objective of creating a smaller,
different and more effective state, reform in Croatia
has to move in three directions: 1) the development of
institutions appropriate for a market economy, 2) as-
sistance in the development of a new economic
structure and 3) the application of horizontal measures
of government intervention.
(1) One of the main directions of the reform of gov-
ernment in the Croatian economy has to be the devel-
opment of a system of institutions the purpose of
which is the supervision and regulation of the course
of the market, and the protection of individuals who
have been left without means by market competition.
Institutional reform includes:
- The adjustment of institutions ensuring the
country’s security and implementing law and or-
der, one of the basic functions of the state, to new,
peacetime conditions;
- The development of a stable and transparent
legal system with a set of regulations that in a
predictable and effective way make possible the
maintenance of financial discipline, the manage-
ment of affairs, the protection of the creditor, and
the definition of property rights.  This will in turn
ensure the security of contracts, and a quick and
transparent exit from the market of ineffective
banks and companies.  Changes in the legal sys-
tem can be achieved by investing in the education
of new judges, the retraining of existing person-
nel, the development of contemporary adminis-
trative structures, the updating of equipment, and
pay rises for the judiciary;
- Reform of the state institutions into market-
friendly, capable and independent institutions.
Capable, educated and motivated civil servants
make a capable state.  A state, or government, is
independent to the extent that it does not become
subject to the influence of various interest groups
but makes its decisions independently and respon-
sibly. Transparency of state policy, and clarity,
speed and impartiality of administrative proce-
dures provide security to enterprises in both cur-
rent operations and in planning for the future.
Greater efficiency of state functioning can be
achieved through the development of already ex-
istent market-compatible mechanisms (public
auctions, contracting out certain state functions to
the private sector, for example), reduction in the
number of and change in the structure of public
servants, the development of an incentive system,
staff training and further updating of equipment;
- The need for an incorruptible state admini-
stration.  The creation of stable institutions not
subject to constant changes, the development of a
system of unambiguous laws, an enhancement of
the motivation of civil servants through a reform
in the incentives system, raising the morality of
work through an exemplary system of penalising
the immoral are just some of the ways towards the
reduction of corruption in the state bureaucracy;
- Building up a social security system in which
assistance to those whose welfare is at risk and to
the unemployed will be directed by transfers the
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amount of which will be determined according to
the current income and assets of the individual or
the family, and not by a selective tax policy.  This
will ensure transparency in the granting of welfare
benefits and avoid linearity of measures, with help
really getting to those who need it most.  For this
purpose it is necessary to build up a reliable,
comprehensive and well-protected information
system for monitoring income and assets, and
their distribution among individual groups of the
populace;
- The construction of a reliable and up-dated
statistical system in a clearly defined number of
institutions, which will ensure the base for the
successful management of national economic
policy;
- Constant collaboration and dialogue of all the
main participants in the economic process, which
will greatly facilitate the course of reform.  A so-
cial partnership between the government, the un-
ions and the employers is a guarantee that the re-
forms will be carried out successfully.
(2)  Apart from that, the state has to help in the reallo-
cation of resources for the sake of creating a new,
competitive economic structure.  For this purpose
it should:
 
- Continue the privatisation, and reform the
public enterprises that will remain state owned.
All the public enterprises should be privatised as
soon as possible, or the parts of them that can
function in the market.  In the other public enter-
prises the state, as owner, has to step up control
over the management, and encourage them to be
exposed to the laws of the market;
- Make an impact on the creation of new market
structures through the regulation of monopolies
and an anti-monopoly policy, as well as the regu-
lation of takeovers and mergers.  Since a more
powerful development of the financial markets
can be expected to occur, it is particularly impor-
tant to stress the regulation of the financial sector,
which includes the banks, the capital market, and
the insurance companies;
- Abandon the policy of using soft budgetary
constraint with respect to troubled companies,
which leads to opaque direct or indirect subsidies
(for example, bailing out companies through ex-
emptions from payment of taxes or contributions
which expands the moral hazard);
-  Define a clear policy with respect to loss-
making industries.  In the world at large, the pol-
icy of subsidising production has mainly been
abandoned, and a transition has occurred to subsi-
dising the costs of their getting out of the market.
It is important to study and work up this approach,
because in the coming period in Croatia there will
be bankruptcies of a considerable number of inef-
fective companies;
- Set up retraining centres for workers getting
out of industries that are closing down. In par-
ticular, facilitate the acquisition of entrepreneu-
rial, managerial and marketing capacities in order
to develop the new entrepreneurial spirit neces-
sary for the launching of new product lines;
- Create a network of agencies for the assistance
of small and medium sized companies. Such
agencies would disseminate information about
loan facilities and financial markets, about new
technology, training opportunities, export markets
and the like. This kind of policy would reduce the
barriers in the way of SME getting into the mar-
ket, for they too would have at their disposal the
kind of information that large corporations can
easily come by.
(3)  Through measures of horizontal and not selective
policy the state ought to improve the working of the
market so as to raise the quality of key economic in-
puts: of the economic infrastructure, of labour and
capital, R & D.  Today, in most countries the prevail-
ing opinion is that a market that has grown on such
bases will ensure the greatest possible efficiency of
resource allocation and lead to economic growth.  A
market-friendly state should place the accent on the
application of horizontal economic measures, which
mainly relate to:
- State investment in the economic infrastruc-
ture, especially in the transportation and tele-
communications networks, and in power supply,
but only in those parts where the market has fallen
down;
- The building up of a contemporary education
system capable of equipping human resources
with the kind of knowledge that will enable flexi-
bility in the workplace and mobility in the labour
market, and develop a sense of personal responsi-
bility.  This will gradually reform the inherited
way of thinking about the state as ensuring total
security for individuals, and will create the bases
for the development of the entrepreneurial spirit.
The facilities for continuing education have to be
provided, which will make sure that the capabili-
ties and resourcefulness of the working population
are maintained in conditions of rapid develop-
ments in technology on the one hand, and post-
ponement of the retirement age on the other.  It is
necessary to work out models for educating a
critical mass of students abroad to develop a sys-
tem to transfer know-how to our economy.  It is
particularly important to highlight the need for the
acquisition of managerial skills, which are today
in short supply at all levels of the state, as well as
in companies and banks.
- The creation of new forms of support for re-
search and development, the encouragement of the
dissemination of the state of the art in technology,
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stepping up international collaboration in science
and the professions, and ensuring technology
transfer.  Here it is particularly important to stress
the stimulation of direct foreign investment,
which will facilitate the rapid transfer of know-
how and technology;
- The implementation of an environmental protec-
tion policy through the development of ecologi-
cally acceptable industries, the introduction of a
green tax, and the regulation of existing polluters.
The development of market institutions, help in the
reallocation of resources so as to create a competitive
economic structure, the avoidance of selective meas-
ures, and the application of horizontal measures to
improve the quality of the economic infrastructure
represent the basic guidelines along which the devel-
opment of the state in Croatia should go at the present
time. This will be a lengthy and painful process re-
quiring a lot of persistence and consistency; it is,
however, the only one that in the long run can lead to
a state that is smaller in extent and more qualitative in
its operations.
PART TWO
2.1 The Budgetary process and budgetary
institutions
The basics
The budgetary process is the system of the main rules
(formal and informal) that enable the executive to
make decisions that lead to the preparation of the
Budget, its proposal and acceptance in parliament, and
finally to the execution of the Budget.  The budgetary
process is the means by which the state defines the
overall plan of the Budget (the planned level of reve-
nue and expenditure), and within which decisions are
made about the allocation of resources.  Through the
allocation of resources, the budgetary process is a use-
ful tool for ensuring the effective administration of the
state.
There are three phases in the budgetary process: 1) the
preparation of the Budget proposal, 2) presenting the
Budget to parliament and approval, and 3) the execu-
tion (implementation, supervision and control) of the
Budget.
The fiscal (budgetary) institutions are the key to the
successful functioning of the budgetary process.  Only
effective functioning of all the institutions (ministry of
finance, government, parliament, state auditing) in the
budgetary process make possible the implementation
of the planned fiscal policy.
The situation
In 1994, Croatia passed the Budget Law (OG 92/94).
According to this law, the Budget is defined as an es-
timate of the annual revenues and receipts, and the
determined amount of expenditures and other pay-
ments made by the state (and local government units)
for all budgetary beneficiaries and approved by par-
liament.  Budgetary beneficiaries are ministries and
other bodies of the administration, bodies of the gov-
ernment, and other beneficiaries financed out of the
national Budget.  The Law states the procedures for
the planning of, manner of drawing up, passing and
executing the national Budget, borrowing and the na-
tional debt, and supervision of the Budget.
Almost five years since this Law was passed and
started to be implemented.  In this period, there have
been many changes that call for an analysis of the
Budget, and in particular of the budgetary process.
We will cite just a few of the most important items:
• Since 1994, national or public sector spending
has substantially increased its share of GDP, and
in 1998 public sector expenditure made up 52%
of GDP.  Croatia actually has the greatest public
sector expenditure in terms of percentage of GDP
of any of the countries in transition.
• The proportion of the national Budget in GDP
has also increased.
• There are no systematic data about the level of
the public debt, nor are there any restrictions on
the deficit or the national debt.
• In the last five years the Budget has been rebal-
anced as many as three times (1995, 1998, 1999).
• No prediction of the Budget for a three or four
year period has ever been made to determine the
position of the Budget and its relation with key
macroeconomic indicators.
• The system of internal and budgetary control is
weak and ineffective.
• Not all actions for the establishment of a state
treasury system have not been taken, nor for the
transition to all payments being made from the
single treasury account.
• Lack of Fiscal discipline.
These drawbacks constitute very great limitations in
the implementation and realisation of a sound fiscal
policy.  The reasons for the shortcomings that can be
seen directly in the Budget should be sought in the
weak budgetary process and the feeble functioning of
institutions that are directly involved in the process of
preparing, proposing and executing (implementation,
supervision and control) of the Budget.
The Reasons
Preparation of the Budget. The Ministry of Finance
(MF) is charged with the preparation of the Budget,
which starts with the preparation for the proposal for
the fiscal policy in the coming year, within the out-
lines of the proposal for the three-year fiscal policy.
This proposal should include the drawing up of mac-
roeconomic and fiscal predictions.  The drawing up of
macroeconomic predictions relates to the establish-
ment of a three-year projection of the trends in basic
macroeconomic magnitudes, and the establishment
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and projection of basic budgetary magnitudes, on the
basis of which the fiscal strategy for the three-year
period is then defined.
Back in 1998, the MF promoted its “Principles of Fis-
cal Policy for 1998-2000”, in which, as well as the
trends in the key budgetary magnitudes, the macro-
economic framework for fiscal policy was also drawn
in.  This projection was quickly discarded for its un-
real estimates, but no new projection was ever made.
In budgetary planning praxis to date great difficulties
have been presented by the unrealistic plans of budg-
etary beneficiaries and failure to stick to the pre-
scribed accounting plan of the Budget.  This kind of
procedure has made it very difficult for the Budget
Preparation Office to make more realistic proposals
for the expenditures of the Budget.  The problem is in
weak budgetary control, and failure to carry out
measures aimed at boosting fiscal discipline. An ad-
ditional problem is to be found in a weak information
and control framework, which aggravates the situation
in the overall management of public finances, includ-
ing budgetary planning, as well as supervision and
implementation.
The government, at the recommendation of the MF,
proposes the fiscal policy and defines the strategy of
the national Budget, and lays down proposals for allo-
cating budgetary resources in line with the established
objectives of economic, fiscal and budgetary policy
for the given fiscal year.  In practice to date, one very
great limitation in the implementation of the fiscal and
budgetary policies is the way extremely unrealistic
magnitudes of economic growth indicators, or of GDP
growth, have been accepted.  An overrated GDP eas-
ily creates the basis for an increase in state expendi-
tures for programmes and objectives that the real level
of revenue will not support.  Such procedures militate
against the implementation of programmes, and in
many cases the government’s manoeuvring space is
restricted.  The government has usually found a way
out in home or foreign borrowing, and the issuing of
guarantees to budgetary and private firms.
Approval or passing of the budget.  The budgetary
proposal sent by the government to the parliament
should go through detailed analysis in the Finance and
Budget Committee, and in other parliamentary com-
mittees and bodies.  Only after an analysis of the
budget in the committees can it go for debate in both
houses. The parliament analyses the proposal of the
national Budget, and after debates in both houses (of
Representatives and of Counties) it will adopt the na-
tional Budget and agree to the budgets of the extra-
budgetary funds.
Practice to date shows that parliament has never de-
bated the consolidated general government Budget.
This fact to some extent explains the lack of debate
about the overall deficit of the government and the
lack of any restriction to this deficit.  The reason for
this state of affairs can be found in the weak proposals
of the Budget.  The Budget is proposed to the parlia-
ment with unrealistic assumptions (forecasts) about
revenue, and as a result, the budgetary expenditures to
a very large degree outstrip the available sources of
budgetary resources. During the year this leads to a
reduction of expenditure, partially through a rebal-
ancing of the Budget, forcible collection of claims and
through an accumulation of unpaid bills. Since the
limits of the public debt and the deficit are not de-
fined, the Budget turns to month-by-month deficit fi-
nancing of the beneficiaries of the Budget.
Execution (implementation, supervision and con-
trol) of the Budget. The organisation of a state
treasury is foreseen in the Ministry of Finance. The
basic responsibility of the treasury is to manage the
state’s money and the public debt efficiently.  The
state treasury system consists of three linked admini-
strations or department: for the execution of the na-
tional Budget, for national accountancy, and for man-
aging cash and the public debt.
At present, the MF still does not make all its payments
from the single treasury account that it has at the
CNB.  It is necessary to close down all the other ac-
counts that the Budget still has at commercial banks.
Since 1997, payments have been made from the single
account for some budgetary beneficiaries, with the
provison that during 1999 it was expected that all
other budgetary beneficiaries would be brought into
the system.  One of the problems in bringing the
treasury project to a conclusion is the unsettled ques-
tion of the computer linkage of the three agencies
mentioned into a single unit.
The national Budget execution department, apart from
being supposed to pay out money via the single ac-
count within the framework of the budgetary position
to suppliers of the MF and the consuming agencies,
has an important role in the working out of financial
inflow and outflow during the year.  The budget con-
trol department should have an important position
within this administration.
The national accountancy department records state
transactions on the cash principle.  Only if transac-
tions were made according to the accrual principle
would an integrated picture of the situation of the na-
tional finances be obtained.  The problem inheres in
the constant changes in the accounting monitoring of
the positions and items of the Budget. For this reason
it is difficult to compare the amounts of the resources
of individual positions of the Budget in different
years.
The cash and public debt management department
should run schedules of debts, loans made and guar-
antees issued.  It has to have information at its dis-
posal about the forms of loans and the kinds of secu-
rity instruments for the repayment of loans.  At the
moment there is no overall picture of home and for-
eign borrowing, and plans shown for repayments of
loans up to 2010 are not shown in terms of maturity
dates.  A particular problem is found in the monitor-
ing of the amounts of the guarantees issued.  The ad-
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ministration keeps its eye on the state of cash in the
Budget account, and on the basis of this information
issues treasury bills.  It is questionable to what extent
there is a full insight into the state of the resources of
the Budget when part of the money is kept in the
Budget’s accounts at commercial banks.
Supervision and control of the Budget. The basic task
of MF budgetary and internal supervision is control of
the correct usage of resources for the entire country.
Budgetary and internal supervision were not organ-
ised even during 1998 and 1999, and there is no sign
of operations within the MF.  It is also a problem that
there is no internal supervision in the other benefici-
aries of the national Budget.  And so accordingly no
special working relations have been set up between
the institutions of national auditing and the supervi-
sory institutions.
The state auditing office was set up to supervise and
control the Budget and budgetary beneficiaries.  It
regularly publishes reports about audits it has done
and appends them to parliamentary Budget debates.
Although of very high quality, the findings of the
audits to date about shortcomings in the budgetary
process have not been adequately applied in practice.
Proposals
The Budget should show the state of the national fi-
nances and provide basic information about the meas-
ures that have to be taken in order to carry out a suc-
cessful fiscal policy.  Nevertheless, the Budget is the
result of the budgetary process, in which the key role
is played by the actions and procedures of the budget-
ary institutions.   Improvements in the budgetary pro-
cess then depend upon institutional changes.  This is
the key to the understanding of the challenges that
exist with respect to the improvement of the manage-
ment of public expenditure in Croatia.   Improvement
of the management of public expenditure requires in-
stitutional reform, which means consistent application
of existing laws to do with the Budget, and improve-
ment of the work of the budgetary institutions.  Im-
provements in the budgetary process are impossible if
efficient supervision and implementation mechanisms
are neglected.
To improve the budgetary process, it is necessary to:
• Strengthen the internal links in the budgetary
process, with an emphasis on cooperation among
departments within ministries and other benefici-
aries, and ensure the exchange and distribution of
information (too often considered personal prop-
erty) that leads to an integrated approach in the
proposal of fiscal policy and makes the taking of
correct decisions possible.
• Strengthen the links among the institutions that
take part in the budgetary process system (from
proposing to executing the Budget), and not just
among the central ministries.  Provide flexible
and simple procedures and the consistent appli-
cation of existing laws related to the Budget and
the state treasury system.
• The Finance Ministry has to facilitate transpar-
ency in all the fiscal operations of the state.  For
this purpose it has to aim at a complete view of
all the transactions directly connected with the
Budget.
• Independent research institutions should have a
greater role in the evaluation and review of po-
litical decisions that might have an impact on the
future fiscal position.
• The country needs well developed budgetary in-
stitutions run by competent individuals guided by
correct inputs.  The aims of individuals who
manage public institutions must not differ from
the objectives of the institutions, and these, in
turn, have to be in accord with the public interest.
Such institutions do not spring up over night.
They have to be created and keep on being re-
formed.
• The definition and implementation of a public
expenditure policy have to be founded on an eco-
nomic analysis and estimate of the effects of in-
dividual categories of expenditure and of public
expenditure as a whole.
• Increase supervision and control of the Budget.
The parliamentary finance and Budget committee
has to have the resources and the qualified per-
sonnel to estimate the Budget proposals that the
government sends down to the parliament.  The
professional personnel of the finance and Budget
committee have to be capable of looking criti-
cally at the estimates of the government, and in
the event of there being a great disproportion
between revenue and expenditure and an ineffec-
tive distribution of expenditure, will have to send
the proposal of the Budget back to the govern-
ment, with its criticisms, for review.
• Conclude the organisation of the state treasury
and ensure that payments are made from the sin-
gle account of the state treasury kept at the CNB.
2.2 The optimum level of fiscal decen-
tralisation
Financing local government units in the RC
In 1994 local government and its territorial units
were reorganised, and there was a new manner of
financial local government units; certain drawbacks
have been revealed since this started to be imple-
mented. We shall state some of the more important
problems.
First, constant territorial changes, and the excessive
number of municipalities, have additionally slowed
down the acquisition of data about the real financial
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situation, that is to what extent revenue determined
by the Local Government Finance Law (OG
117/93) has been collected so that the amount
needed in the fiscal equalisation system can be de-
termined.
Second, most local government units newly-created
in 1994 did not have a balance sheet of their assets
and did not know what they had at their disposal, or
what the value of their assets was.
Third, the areas of the Republic of Croatia show a
varying demographic and economic picture.  Con-
stant changes in the size of the area of local units
entail consideration not only of the historical but
also of economic, political and demographic fea-
tures of a given area.  The wealth or poverty of a
local unit derived from an uneven distribution of
natural and economic sources continues to have an
impact on the local government financing system.
An estimate of these inequalities determines the de-
cision about the best assignment of grants to local
government units that cannot meet even the mini-
mum requirements of the populace in their areas.
Fourth, the importance and development of the
tourist sector has contributed still further to the ur-
gency of the question of the development of the is-
lands and the manner in which they are financed. In
a selective approach to the financing of the poorest
local units (including the islands) grants from the
central government remain. However, there is still
the practical problem of how to define the criteria
for the allocation of grants.
Fifth, the participation of central government grants
in the financing of the total public expenditure of
local government determines the degree of depend-
ence of local on central government.  The need has
arisen for the determination of the optimum degree
of fiscal decentralisation.
Sixth, at the local government level, financial sur-
pluses do arise.  The existence of surpluses shows
that there is an unequal level of the meeting of pub-
lic needs.  On the one hand great needs, and on the
other hands surpluses; this raises the question of the
suitability of the system with which local govern-
ment is financed.
Seventh, the revenue of local government is not re-
alistically planned and it is often found that in the
accounts books not all revenue and expenditure
have been recorded, and that prompt collection of
revenue has not occurred.  Some expenditure turns
out to be greater than what was planned, and some
expenditure is made without having been planned at
all.  Some budgetary resources are used for pur-
poses they were not meant for.
It is clear that within the local government financ-
ing system there is a problem of deciding on the
financial resources necessary for a given local gov-
ernment unit for it to be able to fulfil the tasks for
which it has been made responsible.
The financial effects of the new system of financing
local government units
Since the new system for financing local govern-
ment was introduced in Croatia, a disproportion has
been observed in the fiscal capacities of the cities
and the counties and the responsibilities that have
been laid down to provide for public needs at a
given local level.  That is, a large part of the re-
sponsibility for the provision of public services has
been transferred to the counties, which are finding it
hard to carry out the functions laid down by the
law.  In the table below, we can look at the distri-
bution of revenue among the local government
units.
  Table Income per local government units in %
Counties Municipalities Cities Total
1995 12.25 18.90 68.84 100
1996 11.87 18.83 69.29 100
1997   9.80 14.08 76.11 100
1998*   9.25 15.70 75.05 100
* data for 1998 relate to the plan of the Budget
Source: Ministry of Finance, RC, 1999
The financial position of the counties and cities is
considerably better and they even find surpluses
occurring in their budgets.  For this reason it is es-
sential to change the system through which local
government is financed and ensure an enhanced fis-
cal capacity for the counties.  It is crucial to facili-
tate an increased tax sharing, primarily in income
tax and in real estate sales tax.
Fiscal (de)centralisation
In small states the proportion taken by government in
GDP is large, and this share tends to try to maintain
itself.  In Croatia too, the proportion of GDP taken by
the state is growing.
Table  Expenditure of general and local government as %
of  GDP
1995 1996 1997 1998
Consolidated general government 47.74 50.65 50.46 52.17
Local government 4.46 6.05 6.76 6.93
Source: Ministry of Finance, RC; 1998
The expenditure of general government accounted for
47% of GDP in 1994, increased in the next two years,
and in 1998 held fast at the level of about 52%.  The
share of local government rose from about 4.5% in
1995 to almost 7% of GDP in 1998.  The situation
with revenue is similar.
Is this level of revenue and expenditure for Croatian
local government units enough to finance their in-
creased responsibilities?  Since 1997 the central gov-
ernment has transferred numerous responsibilities to
Public Sector Economics
The state of affairs, problems, and possible solutions
QR
local government, for the financing of health care,
social services, the maintenance and building of roads,
while revenue has stayed at a low level. In such con-
ditions it can be expected that there should be a de-
veloped system of grants to lower levels of govern-
ment, so that the uneven sources of income of local
units should be made up. Certainly, local government
should be able to have a large share of revenue from
tax sharing.  All this is to increase the fiscal capacity
of local government.
The degree of centralisation of any system is meas-
ured by the share of the expenditures of central gov-
ernment in total direct expenditure.  The use of this
criterion confirms the statement that central govern-
ment has the lion’s share in the total expenditure.
Table: Distribution of total national spending in Croatia according to level of govern-









1995 87.09 1.56 14.45 100 87.09 12.91
1996 83.96 1.96 14.08 100 83.96 16.04
1997 83.62 1.62 14.76 100 83.62 17.38
1998 82.14 1.53 16.23 100 82.14 17.86
Source: Ministry of Finance, RC, 1999
By far the most is spent at the level of the central gov-
ernment.  For this reason in the coming period it will
be necessary to consider laying down the optimum
degree of fiscal decentralisation, in which, in addition
to considerable responsibilities for financing certain
expenditures, greater authority to gather revenue
should be devolved upon local government; alterna-
tively, their subsidies or grants should be increased.
In spite of all this, the choice of the appropriate degree
of fiscal decentralisation depends upon the central
government and on the extent to which it is prepared
to give local government some autonomy in gathering
the resources that are used to finance local public
services.  The question of fiscal decentralisation is
not, after all, merely of an economic nature.
2.3 The Budget in function of economic
growth - public investment
The bases of public investment
Capital expenditure, or public investment, is a pro-
ductive expenditure, and represents a powerful tool
with which the state can stimulate economic growth.
Public investment (capital expenditure) consists of
investment in private sector production and contrib-
utes to the growth of the economy in the long run.
An important contribution to the understanding of the
role of fiscal policy in long term growth was made by
Barro (1990), in whose model growth is stimulated by
state actions.  A positive link between state expendi-
ture and rate of growth, in this model, derives from
the impact of government spending on private pro-
duction.  It is shown that an increase in productive
public expenditure (investment in private production)
increases the marginal product of private capital,
which has a positive effect on the rate of growth.
However, since apart from productive (capital) ex-
penditure, the government also finances a whole
number of unproductive programmes that do not rep-
resent any investment in private production, the re-
sultant rate of growth is lower than that achieved
when all the expenditures are productive. The conclu-
sions reached by Barro emphasise the need to distin-
guish productive from non-productive expenditure.
Non-productive expenditure does not constitute in-
vestment in private production. It consists of transfers
(apart from expenditure on education), expenditures
for defence, interest payments, wages in the civil
service (especially when there is over-employment)
and so on.
The very procedure of measuring the impact of non-
productive expenditure on the rate of economic
growth is a topic of constant theoretical discussion.
For this reason it is necessary to use the classification
system of Government Financial Statistics, in which
most non-productive expenditure is classified as cur-
rent expenditure.
Particular attention is merited by that part of state
capital expenditure that is used in the process of pub-
lic investment. Public investment here means the total
level of capital expenditure of the state including
capital expenditure of the Budget, the extra-budgetary
funds and local government units.
For that reason it is necessary to make an analysis of
capital expenditure and determine its impact on eco-
nomic growth.  In every state it is essential to make
sure of the kind of classification of the Budget that
will enable an analysis and monitoring of public (cur-
rent and capital) expenditure.  This is particularly es-
sential with attempts to determine the level of public
investment and its impact on economic growth.
The situation with respect public investment in the RC
The article “Public Investment in Croatia” by Anto
Bajo and Katarina Ott published in Financial Practice
1 in 1999 can serve as a starting point for an analysis
of the state of public investments in Croatia.  In this
analysis of public investment there was an attempt to
adjust the statistical methods of the public sector in
Croatia to the GFS practices used in most countries in
the developed world.
The analysis of public investment shows that the main
capital expenditure is financed at the level of central
government, and that funds from the central govern-
ment Budget are crucial in the financing of capital
projects.  In practice, funds for financing capital proj-
ects are mainly given from the central Budget to the
appropriate ministries.  The competent ministries as-
sign funds for local projects, usually in line with some
key and usually according to priorities.  Funds can be
made available via the Croatian Bank for Reconstruc-
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tion and Development (CBRD) or the commercial
banks.
In the period 1994-1997 capital expenditure of the
state mainly related to reconstruction of the infra-
structure damaged during the war, particularly houses,
roads, water mains and health care infrastructure.
Nevertheless, data that reveal the sector structure of
public investment show a emphasis on “development
oriented” capital expenditure.  Public expenditure for
“reconstruction” came to a head in 1996 when it
amounted to 33%, falling back to 20% of all public
investment in 1998.  It should be said that the minis-
tries themselves do the categorising of their projects,
and the distinction of expenditure according to “re-
construction” and  “development” is not entirely reli-
able.
Looking at the sector structure of public investment in
the period from 1994 to 1998, it is easily seen that in
1994 the biggest category of public investment was
“public administration building” (including buildings,
equipment, maintenance, and border crossings).  In
1995-1997, public investment for “reconstruction”
was the largest category.  However, in the Budget for
1998, investment in public administration buildings
was once again the biggest individual category of
public investment (21%).  The third biggest category
was spending on roads, which had, however, fallen
from their maximum 19% in the 1996 Budget to 14%
in that for 1998. After them came investment in the
water industry and residential buildings for disabled
veterans.
In the public investment system, attention is merited
by the role of CBRD loans in the financing of public
investment.   In a certain sense, CBRD loans represent
an additional budgetary financing of capital projects.
The CBRD obtains annual injections of funds from
the Budget, and most of the lending activities of the
bank go on for the state and should not be taken to
imply any independent investment decisions of this
financial institution.  Data from the annual reports
show that more than 90% of the loans of the CBRD in
the first three years of its operations (1993 - 1995)
were spent on the reconstruction programme (mainly
the water industry, flats and so on).  After this, the
CBRD started to make loans on behalf of and at the
expense of the MF (about 10% of CBRD loans in
1995, but more than 50% in 1996), while the main
beneficiaries of CBRD loans were state-owned enter-
prises or enterprises managed by the state, particularly
in the areas of the water industry, construction and
electricity generation.  In 1996, 35% of the funds of
the CBRD went to the tourist sector.  Since 1996, the
CBRD has been lending increasingly to private enter-
prises.
The position of local government in the financing of
public investment.  The low level of local government
revenue is a big barrier to its doing anything to take a
more active role in the financing of public investment.
The fiscal capacity of, for example, most of the coun-
ties, is below average.  Because of this, capital proj-
ects at the local level are financed at the central level,
the MF and other competent ministries.  It is impossi-
ble to give any estimate of the share of foreign funds
in the financing of capital projects at local govern-
ment level, because there are no systematic data. It is
also impossible to give any account of spending bro-
ken down into sectors at a local level. Unfortunately
there is no appropriate collaboration in the unification
and systematisation of data among local government
units (communes and cities) and the finance depart-
ments of the counties.
Reasons
At the moment it is difficult to get an overall view of
the level and structure of public investment in Croatia.
This state of affairs is the result of the lack of exis-
tence of an overall strategy or programme for public
investment.  Such a programme ought to contain: 1. a
long-term strategy for public investing with key par-
ticipants (institutions) in the process of public invest-
ment, 2. an explanation of how a public investment
programme fits in with the aims of the macroeco-
nomic policy of the country and 3. a planned level of
expenditure per sector and the structure of expendi-
tures within a sector, sources of financing and so on.
A programme of public investment should include all
projects that have a direct impact on the national
Budget, from which capital projects are financed.
A key precondition for any proposals for a pro-
gramme of public investment is the efficient func-
tioning of the institutions involved in the process of
public investment and a clear division of roles and
authorities among those participating in that process.
Practice to date in Croatia relating to public invest-
ment has shown great weaknesses in the institutional
framework.  Some problems in the institutional
framework need highlighting. In order, then, they are
as follows.
The state treasury. Budgetary funds, particularly on
the expenditure side, are dissipated in various ways.
The reason is the absence of any efficient supervision
of the movements in funds on the revenue and on the
expenditure side of the Budget.  The state treasury, as
organisational unit responsible for the preparation,
execution and control of the national Budget, the
management of funds and the national accounting
system, should be located within the MF.  This means
the establishment of a state treasury with a single ac-
count book and a single account, which makes possi-
ble direct allocation of resources to beneficiaries.
A consolidated national balance sheet.  The resources
of public companies and agencies and the CBRD
should be included into the consolidated Budget.  This
also means the integration of activities carried out by
the Payments Clearing Institute and the Ministry of
Finance, taking over the PCI database, and leaving the
PCI the sole agency for payments clearing.  This
would make possible a more transparent and a
cheaper control of the state treasury and an evaluation
of the financial activities of the state sector.  In some
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more detailed research it would be very interesting to
analyse the annual reports of the PCI and determine
what its real position in the public sector is.
Local finances. There is no fairly detailed analysis of
public investment at the local government level.  Sev-
eral cases of public investment at the local level show
that it is possible to finance investment locally. It
would be worth taking a closer look at the real cir-
cumstances, needs and possibilities of local govern-
ment in the financing of capital projects from their
own resources.  Local governments should have sepa-
rate budgets for capital and current expenditure.  This
would make it possible to have a more transparent
review of resources for capital investment and a more
economical approach to investment, because there
would be less administration in the ministries.
Allocation of funds via the CBRD. Funds for capital
projects derive from the central government’s Budget
and from international financial institutions.  There is
a special part of the national Budget for the financing
of capital expenditure.  In it, there is a more detailed
account of the funds needed to be allocated to indi-
vidual beneficiaries.  Since 1995 a considerable
amount of the resources for the financing of capital
projects has been channelled through the CBRD. It
would be useful to explain the role of Ministry of Re-
construction and Development (MRD), the relation
between that ministry and CBRD, and explain the
ways of and criteria for allocating resources to indi-
vidual beneficiaries.  This would take for granted a
serious analysis of cost benefits, and an evaluation of
the investment.  It is impossible to give systematic
data about capital expenditure financed via the Croa-
tian Bank for Reconstruction and Development and
the MRD.
Financing reconstruction against financing develop-
ment. As one of the consequences of the war, most of
the resources for capital projects were put into recon-
struction, and only a smaller part into growth (into
tourism since 1996, and into small and medium size
enterprises). Most of the funds were put into the pub-
lic enterprises (the water industry, road building and
electricity generation and distribution), but it is not
always easy to distinguish reconstruction from devel-
opment.  It would be a good idea to make a firmer
distinction between the two and decide what is an ap-
propriate division of funds between them. Apart from
that, there are grounds for concern in the large share
of non-productive investment in administration
buildings and equipment (about 20% of all public in-
vestment on average), which squeezes out the very
necessary greater investment in production.
Guarantees.  The existence of a wide selection of
state guarantees leads to the need for answers to sev-
eral questions: (1) What kind of guarantees ought to
figure in the national Budget? (2) Is there a single list
of all guarantees issued in the last few years? (3) In
that list, is it possible to see what guarantees have ex-
pired, and which are still valid? (4) Is the total amount
of guarantees issued added to the total indebtedness of
the country and should they be counted as a part of the
public debt?
The roles of agencies. The position of the Croatian
guarantees agency (CGA) and other agencies in the
public sector is unclear. It would seem that their assets
are part of the Budget (their equipment is financed
from the Budget), but the situation with respect to
their obligations is not entirely unambiguous.  It
should be evident whether the items of their financial
reports are in balance, and who controls their items in
the Budget. It is absolutely essential for there to be
transparent data about whether the state has paid its
part into the CGA or not, whether the CGA guaran-
tees are included in the list of total national obliga-
tions, whether they are included in the public debt,
home or foreign and so on.
Proposals:
• Re-examine the role of institutions that take part
in the process of public investment (Payments
Clearing Institute, state agencies and public enter-
prises, local government, CBRD and so on).
• Make an analysis of and separate the financing of
reconstruction and development.
• Evaluate and limit the size of state guarantees is-
sued.
• Include foreign sources of financing in the analy-
ses of public investment.
• Apply a cost benefit analysis, and ensure a trans-
parent process of evaluating projects in the budg-
etary procedure.
• Define criteria for determining the position of all
the public enterprises and their links with the
Budget.
• Improve cooperation inside the overall capital fi-
nancing system (reinvestigate the spending of the
relevant ministries).
• Step up the financing of development projects and
restrict funds directed to buildings and equipment
for the administration.
• Facilitate an integrated analysis of all public ex-
penditure.
• Unify the programme of public investment and
coordinate the evaluation of investment projects.
QJ
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2.4 Fiscal transparency
Basics
A transparent budgetary process ensures clear infor-
mation about all aspects of fiscal policy.  A key role
in transparency is played by actions and procedures
oriented to informing parliament and the public pre-
cisely about the intentions of the fiscal policy, about
the budgetary accounts and about the projections of
the Budget.  A budget that includes numbers of sepa-
rate accounts and that does not manage to consolidate
all fiscal activities in the bottom line is not transpar-
ent.  A budget that is easily available and intelligible
to the public and those who take part in the decision-
making process, and which displays consolidated in-
formation, is transparent.
The IMF has prescribed minimum standards for trans-
parency in the Budget and in procedures in the budg-
etary process.  We will highlight the basic actions and
procedures that the state should undertake in the
preparation and execution of the Budget.
When preparing the Budget, the Finance Ministry
should include within the Budget plan: 1) the aims of
fiscal policy and their feasibility 2) fiscal regulations
and 3) the macroeconomic framework.
Annual expectations have to be shown in the Budget,
and there should be a clear report about the intentions
of the government’s fiscal policy, the consequences of
the current fiscal policy, and the sustainability of fis-
cal policy over the medium and long term.
The central government should regularly publish data
about the level and structure of debts and the financial
assets that represents the amount of the net debt. Re-
ports about the debt should contain information about
the size of the central government debt, including
loans and bonds issued.
The annual Budget should be shown within an intelli-
gible and appropriate quantitative macroeconomic
framework.  The minimum standard requires that a
report about the Budget be made in the medium term
macroeconomic framework, including the basic pre-
sumptions for the macroeconomic predictions on
which the Budget is founded.
The execution and supervision of the Budget is based
on: 1) the accounting system and 2) auditing (internal
and external) of the Budget account.  An intelligible
and integrated accounting system should be set up,
one that is based on a good control system. An effi-
cient system of state accountancy should ensure in-
formation adequate for estimation of the amounts of
overdue accounts, payments or revenue.  Parliament
and the public should be able to have high quality fis-
cal data and information provided by the state audit-
ing establishment.
The lack of transparency or the weak transparency of
the Budget may increase the electorate’s confusion
and reduce politicians’ interest in being fiscally ac-
countable.  In practice various tricks are used to make
an impact on the attitudes of the taxpayer. These in-
clude: 1) Overestimating the expected economic
growth, so that take revenue is also overestimated,
and the size of the expenditure is underestimated.  At
the end of the fiscal year the unexpected fiscal deficit
is attributed to unforeseen macroeconomic events for
which the state can claim not to be responsible. 2)
Keeping various items outside the Budget.  Budgetary
resources are used by institutions that are not included
in the state Budget. 3) Strategic use of a long-term
projections.  Publishing a three-year plan for fiscal
adjustment within which all the difficult measures in
fiscal policies have to be taken, politicians can buy
time without any intention of actually carrying out the
policy sketched out.
The current state of fiscal transparency in the RC
In the public finance practice of the RC to date, short-
comings in the budgetary process have been reflected
directly in lack of fiscal transparency. Feeble control
of the Budget, the absence of a macroeconomic
framework and of realistic planning are connected
with weak fiscal responsibility of those in charge of
economic and, in particular, fiscal policy.  These fac-
tors also put a limit on the making of correct decisions
about the allocation of budgetary resources.  The
situation with respect to fiscal (budgetary) transpar-
ency is described in the next section.
Planning the Budget. When the Budget is being
planned, the annual expectations from the macroeco-
nomic environment are only denoted in outlines, as is
the report about the intentions of fiscal policy.  There
is no evaluation of the effect of the existing fiscal
policy, nor the sustainability of this policy from the
mid to long term.  There is no midterm budgetary
framework in which it would be possible to estimate
and predict trends of key budgetary aggregates over a
period of 2 to 3 years.  In Croatia there is not even any
formal methodology for macroeconomic prediction. It
is very difficult to talk of any use of advanced, so-
phisticated quantitative models, particularly because
of the constant economic changes and other limita-
tions.
In the annual Budget the main fiscal risks are not
stated nor are they put in figures so that their impact
on the realisation and implementation of the Budget
can be determined (for instance, the impact of a
growth in budgetary deficit of 1% on growth of GDP,
interest rates, the assumed exchange rate, changes in
the wages of public sector employees, the number of
beneficiaries of welfare programmes, the effect on
financial restructuring, the bailing out of the banks,
the realisation of the Budget, and so on).
There are no publicly available and complete sources
of information about expenditure shown according to
functional and economic classifications.  Expenditure
is classified and published only according to adminis-
trative categories. There is the provision of neither a
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report on or classification of expenditure in terms of
programmes, sub-programmes or categories of activ-
ity.  This programme classification should be an ap-
pendix to the traditional administrative classification.
The execution of the Budget.  The MF only occasion-
ally publishes just parts of the details about the bor-
rowings of the country.  The problem inheres in the
lack of any legislative framework to regulate the
scope of the public debt.  There are also no complete
data about state guarantees (how many have been is-
sued, the amount, maturity, and to what extent they
are a threat to the expansion of the public debt).
It is a question to what extent the state of the overall
balance sheet in official statistics is realistically pre-
sented, when one knows that they do not take into ac-
count obligations brought forward, obligations relat-
ing to guarantees issued (from the agencies, from the
extra-budgetary funds, the CBRD) and to what extent
the obligations of the other public financial corpora-
tions and non-financial institutions affect the overall
deficit of the public sector.  An chart of accounting
has been prescribed for the national Budget and for
beneficiaries of the national Budget.  The transactions
of the state are recorded on the cash basis principle.
Only if transaction were recorded according to the
accrual principle would a real picture of the state of
the national finances be obtained.
Recommendations
Increasing the degree of fiscal transparency is difficult
to achieve.  Experts give three possibilities for im-
proving the transparency of the Budget.  1. The legal
approach, so-called, which emphasises the need for a
greater number of rules and laws to regulate the
preparation, organisation and execution of the Budget.
This approach might have opposite results if complex
rules and procedures are brought in that constitute the
basis for additional lack of transparency in budgetary
procedures.  2. Giving political independence to the
public body responsible for the transparency, preci-
sion and projection (forecasting) of the national
Budget. 3. The most radical but the most effective ap-
proach is giving the task of checking the precision and
transparency of the budgetary process to some private
institution.  Apart from that, the national Budget has
to be based on economic forecasts and projections of
international organisations or private institutions in
order to avoid strategic manipulations of the forecasts.
To boost fiscal transparency in the RC it is necessary
to:
1. Ensure a functional classification of the extra-
budgetary funds, including the privatisation fund.
2. Improve the statistics of local government, which
should be gathered by the MF and not the Payment
Clearing Institute (PCI).  These statistics will have to
include data about transfers and grants given by local
government units to each other, consolidated with the
budgets of all types of government.
3. Incorporate public enterprises, agencies and banks
owned by the state (e.g., the CBRD) into the regular
Budget.  Lack of transparency of transactions among
them creates great opportunities for various kinds of
irregularity and waste.
4. Coordinate and unify the gathering of data about
the preparation and execution of the Budget from
various sources, like ministries, agencies, extra-
budgetary funds, local government and the PCI. Even
data inside the Finance Ministry are frequently insuf-
ficiently transparent.
5. Improve the statistics system, and in particularly
computerisation, in the extra-budgetary funds so that
the data might be obtained in time.
6. The Finance Ministry should publish more con-
sistent and more de-aggregated date, with more analy-
sis. In this case it might be possible to make a more
detailed analysis of public expenditure.
For an evaluation of the real level of public in-
vestment in Croatia, the resources and transactions (to
do with loans) of the CBRD have to be consolidated
with the resources and transactions with the central
government.
PART THREE
3.1 About the public debt
The concept of public debt
Since it is exceptionally difficult to define unambigu-
ously everything the public sector in the economy
covers, it is clear that the definition of the indebted-
ness of the public sector is also not without its prob-
lems.1 In all countries what certainly figures in the
public debt is borrowings by central and lower gov-
ernmental units. However, if the public debt is defined
as the accumulated borrowings of the state, or the sum
of all claims that its creditors have upon the state at a
given moment, are then not the debts of the public
corporations, the state agencies or the social security
and other “national” funds also part of the public
debt?  According to the common conception of the
public sector, the answer should be affirmative, but in
the practice of quite a large number of countries this is
not the case, and so in particular in the case of inter-
national comparisons it is necessary to take account of
the problem of the varying scope of the concept of
public debt.
                                                
1 It is necessary to differentiate debt from deficit. Debt at a given moment of
time comprises the sum of all the budgetary deficits made in the previous
period.  When one talks about the public debt, this is to do with cumulative
budgetary deficits that the state has financed by borrowing. That is, debt is
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Since the public sector has a different scope from
country to country, the IMF has developed a statistical
system for public finances (GFS - Government Fi-
nance Statistics) that relatively precisely and uni-
formly define the public sector.2 Respecting GFS
methodology and the definition of the “general gov-
ernment”, the public debt of the Republic of Croatia
can be defined as the sum of the borrowings of the
national Budget, the extra-budgetary funds and units
of local government. Depending on whether the debt
is owed to creditors at home or abroad, we distinguish
between internal and external public debt.
In the sense of public debt, the term the national debt
can often be encountered. However, the need to make
certain distinctions does nevertheless exist.  When it is
a matter of the internal public debt or the indebtedness
of the country, one can really say that these are syn-
onymous. On the other hand, in connection with the
foreign debts of a country, we can say that it is a
wider concept, because it includes both the indebted-
ness of the public sector, i.e., the public debt, and also
the foreign debt of the other economic sectors (banks,
companies, households).  Sometimes for public debt
the term public credit or loan is used, but public credit
(loan) is a narrower concept than the public debt and
represents just one of the way of financing the public
debt.
Problems / situation
Structural and conjunctural budgetary deficit
Apart from the state borrowing for structural reasons,
for example, to finance certain infrastructure and
other projects that are publicly useful, a public debt
can also be an important instrument of macroeco-
nomic policy.  Used at the right moment, the public
debt can contribute to the stimulation of economic
growth and the improvement of the overall economic
conditions, which as well as on the growth of budget-
ary revenue also has a positive effect on employment
and incomes.  Used in the right way, the public debt
can give a positive impulse to a growth in domestic
savings, the creation of an investment culture and
contribute to the development of the capital market.
For example, such a stimulus can be the refinancing
of an old debt with new and marketable instruments,
which opens the door for the central bank to use indi-
rect market mechanisms to implement its monetary
policy. The domestic market for the public debt will
deepen, increased market liquidity leads to additional
investor confidence and the future stable yield curve
from the long-term public debt becomes the most reli-
                                                
2 GFS are coordinated with the system of national accounts and other statistics
(balance of payments, monetary statistics). With respect to the coverage of the
public sector, not even the GFS methodology is perfect.  The public sector in
the gathering of statistical data is limited to the so-called “general govern-
ment” and does not embrace, for instance, public corporations or monetary
institutions. However, in countries in transition, the application of a unified
definition and classification system represents an enormous gain in a clear and
unified statistical coverage of the public sector.  In the Republic of Croatia,
statistical data in the public sector have been kept according to GFS since
1994.
able market signal about where (at home or abroad) it
is most profitable to put the national economy in debt.
If we look at the situation in this country in the light
of these facts, we can conclude that the effects of
structural borrowing and the macroeconomic aspects
of the public debt at the level of decision makers in
professional and political circles have not been de-
bated.  If there actually has been some debate, never-
theless, no tangible positive results have appeared.
Government borrowing and monetary policy
Since financing the deficit with direct or indirect
(long-term) borrowing from the central bank is noth-
ing but a straightforward increase in the money sup-
ply, most countries have a strictly legally regulated
relationship between the central bank and the gov-
ernment.  From this point of view the relation between
the central bank and the state today is largely related
to short-term bridging loans to tide the government
over the gap between the inflow of revenue and the
execution of budgetary expenditures.  In our case, the
national Budget can borrow from the CNB up to 5%
of the amount of the Budget, short-term, while no ban
on long-term borrowing at the CNB is expressly
stated in Croatian legislation.  What is more, the gov-
ernment can go in for long-term budgetary borrowing
by the passing of a decree with the force of law,
which was made possible by the passing of the “Law
about the authority of the government of the Republic
of Croatia” to determine some questions from the
sphere of influence of the House of Representatives of
the Parliament of the Republic of Croatia.
The political aspect of the public debt
Every responsible government has to pay attention to
the impact of obligations arising from the public debt
and repayments of it on future budgetary expenditure,
because short-term thinking can considerably affect a
qualitative narrowing of space for future decisions.
Using the public debt deliberately to achieve momen-
tary political effects and roll over the costs of them to
the future has a negative effect on the maintenance of
the flexibility of the national budget and mainly en-
tails a reduction in prosperity for future generations.
This means that the question of financing public ex-
penditure by borrowing or taxation, has, apart from an
economic, a political component as well, and that
there has to be a clear legislative framework in order
to control public sector borrowing.  From this point of
view, in the Republic of Croatia there has so far been
no integrated law, (for instance, a public debt law), to
regulate public sector borrowing. Instead, the prob-
lems of the borrowings of the Budget, the extra-
budgetary funds, and local government, are regulated
by different laws, including the Budget Execution
Law, which is passed yearly.
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The problem of state guarantees
Although it is not a direct debt by the state, a state
guarantee can become so at any moment and become
a burden to the national budget and the taxpayer.  The
use of a state guarantee can be seen in the reduction of
the cost of financing those figures in the economy that
have the ability to pay back a debt.  Those who do not
have this ability either today or in the future are the
main source of danger for the transformation of a
guarantee into a public debt.  The fact that the number
of valid and activated guarantees is constantly grow-
ing focuses particular attention on the importance of a
strictly regulated and transparent procedure for issu-
ing guarantees and on the need for collaboration of all
the institutions that have some authority in the matter.
In line with this, state guarantees issued should be an
integral part of the statistics of the public debt, which,
separately from the real public debt, should contain a
review of all current state guarantees, that is, of po-
tential public debt.  Thus, when it thinks of how the
deficit will be financed and whether at home or
abroad, a responsible government, apart from its
“own” financial needs, has to bear in mind both the
economic effects of borrowing at present, and the
consequences of the repayment of the debt in the fu-
ture.  It also has to be aware that putting out a helping
hand for those who cannot tread water in the market
can pull even the best intentioned lifeguard to the
bottom, especially if he overestimates his own ca-
pacities.
The current state and structure of the Croatian public
debt
The largest part of the Croatian public debt derives
from the particular features of the former political and
economic system, and collapse, of ex-Yugoslavia.
This relates to both the internal and the external public
debt.  At the moment it is not possible to forecast the
trends in the state and structure of the Croatian public
debt and whether the burden will grow in time.  It
seems that the reason for this lies only to a small ex-
tent in the uncertainty and challenges that time brings,
but mostly in the lack of respect for the elementary
laws of economic theory and practice.  From the point
of view of the public debt, the application of IMF
GFS standards should have made possible in the
country a precise way of registering the state of both
the domestic and the foreign public debt. However,
there is a general impression that domestic public debt
statistics lag considerably behind other public sector
statistics.  This can particularly be seen in the fact that
the Finance Ministry of the RC has not even today
published an overall review of the state and structure
of the public debt, although Article 35 of the Budget
Law obliges it to keep a schedule of the public debt.
The inevitable conclusion is that: (a) since the passing
of the Budget Law in 1994 no integrated and complete
schedule of the public debt has actually been drawn
up, or (b) the data are known, but are not being made
available to the public.
Incautiously = irresponsibly
In the light of the current economic situation and the
savings and investment gap, one has to bear in mind
the importance of a cautious and carefully thought out
approach to public borrowing, particularly abroad,
and an efficient use of borrowed funds.  Foreign sav-
ing can easily become a double-edged sword, par-
ticularly if the funds borrowed are not used effec-
tively.  And it is a fact that particularly the “inherited”
debt, which is a preponderant part of the total public
debt abroad, was not effectively used, while “new”
borrowings are also dubiously effective.  The eco-
nomic (lack of) independence of the country, particu-
larly its role and position in international capital mar-
kets, also has a very important impact on public debt
policy. Thus for a small country it is an imperative to
fit the dynamics of borrowing to the situation in the
international market.
Looked at from the level of the national economy,
pulling out of the domestic market and turning to the
foreign market hardly represents magnanimity on the
part of a government that wishes to prevent private
demand from being crowded out, rather it is a superfi-
cially rational decision to seek cheaper financing
abroad. However, if it does not pay the state (which
by definition always borrows at the most favourable
conditions) to borrow even the smallest amount on the
domestic market, how could it pay private enterprise?
If we recall once more the view of most experts in the
field that the state is a relatively inept entrepreneur
and that according to the criterion of efficacy public
investment cannot compare with private sector in-
vestment, it is clear why decision-makers have to be
aware that the Croatian debt is not the same as the
American public debt, which can be refinanced until
the day of judgement and in essence never falls due,
and that hiccups in the world capital market can have
serious consequences, particularly for small and open
economies.
Proposals and measures
The statistical coverage of the public debt
It is high time the Finance Ministry drew up and pub-
lished an integrated schedule of the public debt. This
should, apart from the government level, also include
lower levels of government and the extra-budgetary
funds.  Apart from expanding the statistical frame-
work, it is necessary to reinvestigate and adjust the
already existing methodology of data gathering.3
The state of the external debt is tracked by the CNB,
as part of the entire foreign indebtedness.  However,
                                                
3 Even if we neglect the statistics of the Finance Ministry of RC not publish-
ing (keeping up with?) the state of the debt of the extra-budgetary funds and
local government, the requirement for the reinvestigation of the existing
methodology derives from the fact that from the monthly data of the MF
about the internal debt of the RC it is not possible to see the state of the debt
at the CNB (see e.g. Table 12 from the monthly statistical review of the MF
no. 49 and Table C1 from the Bulletin of the CNB no. 44).  This very large-
scale oversight alone gives grounds for an overhaul of the entire methodology
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CNB statistics from this point of view depend on the
very questionable alacrity of the MF in reporting bor-
rowings made. For this reason the Finance Ministry
should keep records about the state and structure of
the foreign public debt (in terms of instruments, debt-
ors and so on) that after coordination with the CNB
should be made available to the public.
The sale of state assets and the public debt
Anticipated revenue from the privatisation of state
owned corporations must not be the basis on which
any kind of borrowing is made at home or abroad, as
was the case, for instance, with Croatian Telecommu-
nications.  By its very nature, revenue from privatisa-
tion is one-off and ultimately depends on the market
value of the assets being sold off.  Market conditions
and preferences change from day to day, and what
was interesting to potential buyers yesterday will not
necessarily be so tomorrow.  The estimated value of
all assets (particularly firms) is a relative affair, and
therefore it is highly unreasonable to act on the prin-
ciple of spending yesterday what we will get tomor-
row.  Tomorrow, for example, when they know that
the vendor has got into debt on the basis of the assets
being sold, potential purchasers are likely to offer less
than would otherwise be the case.
When income from the sales of state assets is con-
cerned, economic logic requires that in the state bal-
ance sheet that they should be cancelled, or placed in
the items of the repayment of old debts or the pur-
chase of other assets, and not in government con-
sumption.  If we restrict ourselves to revenue from
state-owned firm privatisation there is no point in
buying another company with funds derived from the
sale of the first company.  The only logical alternative
is to buy up some of the public debt.
Public debt policy
An essential difference between private and public
borrowing is that the benefits or damages that can
arise from public sector borrowing will ultimately af-
fect all the citizens of a country, without exception.
In order to maximise the benefits, and reduce the pos-
sible damage to the lowest possible level, it is neces-
sary to define a public debt policy.  Just as good man-
agement represents the foundations of the business
policy of a company, so the optimum policy with re-
spect to the public debt has to start from management
of the public debt.  The legislative framework should
provide a public debt law. This would, for example, in
a single place, define the concept of the public debt;
the conditions and manner of borrowing; authorities,
responsibilities and competences; control mecha-
nisms; effective and responsible management of the
debt and of surpluses; risk protection and so on.
Issuing guarantees
The criteria that someone seeking a guarantee must
satisfy have to be clear and accessible to the public,
and the possibility of discretionary (political) deci-
sions must be reduced to the absolute minimum.
When the conditions are being determined, the credi-
bility of the guarantee-seeker has to be in the first
place, because no right-minded country allows state
guarantees to be used to bail out troubled companies;
instead, they are part of the policy of encouraging in-
vestment, exports and so on.
The state of affairs has to be urgently recorded,
i.e., it is necessary to establish the amount of currently
valid guarantees and/or activated guarantees (which
have de facto become part of the public debt).  This
relates not only to the Finance Ministry, but also to
potential guarantees from lower levels of government,
and the issue of guarantees by authorised state agen-
cies and establishments (the Croatian Guarantee
Agency, the Croatian Bank for Reconstruction and
Development).  The list of guarantees has to be up-
dated all the time and made publicly available,
monthly, for example, or quarterly.
PART FOUR
4.1. Review of the Croatian taxation sys-
tem
The current situation of the tax system
After independence, Croatia set about reforming the
inherited taxation system.  Reform started in 1994,
when the Income Tax Law and the Profit Tax Law
were passed, when excise taxes were introduced, and
concluded in 1998 when the VAT Law, passed in
1995, started being implemented.  The objective of
tax reform was the creation of a modern market-
oriented taxation system that was to as great an extent
as possible founded on the following principles of
taxation:
- neutrality in terms of economic decisions, i.e.,
taxes have no effect on relative prices and do
not interfere with the allocative efficiency of
the economy;
- a broad tax base, with as few exemptions as
possible (a broader base permits the applica-
tion of lower rates);
- the macroeconomic tax base should be con-
sumption, so that savings and investment are
to the greatest possible extent freed from
taxes;
- taxes have to provide sufficient public revenue
to allow the state not to have to borrow to
cover reasonable levels of public expenditure;
Public Sector Economics
The state of affairs, problems, and possible solutions
QO
- taxes have to be equitable, that is they have to
be paid according to economic strength;
- the minimum family income should not be
taxed; this introduced progressiveness into the
system;
- welfare politics should not be managed by
taxation policy measures; it is much more ef-
fective to carry out welfare policy by direct
transfers from the Budget;
- taxes have to be as simple as possible to keep
collection and compliance costs down,
- the taxation administration has to be efficient,
quick, transparent and incorruptible, so as to re-
duce the size of the grey economy.
This kind of taxation system ensures an efficient allo-
cation of resources (because it distorts relative prices
to the smallest degree), improve supply of labour, en-
courages private investment, reduces the unofficial
economy and finally ensures the basic economic aim,
and that is economic growth.  At the same time it en-
sures that the tax burden of those sections of the
population most at risk is lightened.
Proposals for change in the taxation system
The application of these principles is largely respected
in the Croatian taxation system, and it should not in
the future be very greatly changed. However certain
specific adjustments that will not upset the consis-
tence of the existing tax system but improve its action
and correct negative effects are desirable.  One should
stress that all changes in the tax system should be
borne out by professional research to consider all the
positive and negative consequences of a given meas-
ure, and link changes in taxation with changes in other
fiscal variables.
1. Reduce the total tax burden
The total tax burden has to be reduced. A high tax
burden brings high tax distortions, i.e., loss of alloca-
tive efficiency and stagnant growth.  As shown in Ta-
ble 1, the total tax burden in Croatia is high, and has
been rising in recent times. The total burden with
taxes and contributions at the level of consolidated
general government rose from 44.40% of GDP in
1995 to 46.61% of GDP in 1998. It is necessary to set
about reducing it, but not so that the need to finance
the government by borrowing occurs.  So it is neces-
sary to reduce public expenditure, which is difficult to
do in the short run and unsystematically, especially if
one bears in mind the traditional downward inelastic-
ity of public expenditure.
2. Lower the standard rate of VAT and the contri-
butions rate
It is possible to lower the total tax burden by re-
ducing the VAT rate and cutting contributions.  In
comparison with other countries, the level of total tax
burden in Croatia is high (see Table 2).  It comes to
46% of GDP in Croatia, in EU countries to 42%, and
to 41% in countries in transition.  Thus it is necessary
to cut tax rates, which refers particularly to cutting the
standard rate of VAT and contributions.
Table 1  TAXATION REVENUE OF CONSOLIDATED GENERAL GOVERNMENT
In million kuna 1995 1996 1997 1998
Total taxation revenue 43,677 47,962 53,282 64,506
Income tax 5,732 6,916 6,714 8,051
Corporation tax 1,401 1,772 2,504 3,477
Social security contributions 13,920 15,534 17,725 19,215
Assets tax 476 551 748 810
Sales tax 17,877 19,011 20,648 28,114
International trade tax 3,922 3,942 4,675 4,256
Other taxes 350 236 267 582
Percentage of a given tax in total tax revenue
Income tax 13.12 14.42 12.60 12.48
Corporation tax 3.21 3.69 4.70 5.39
Contributions 31.87 32.39 33.27 29.79
Assets tax 1.09 1.15 1.40 1.26
Sales tax 40.93 39.64 38.75 43.58
International trade tax 8.98 8.22 8.77 6.60
Other taxes 0.80 0.49 0.50 0.90
As a share of GDP
Total tax revenue 44.40 44.42 42.67 46.61
Income tax 5.83 6.40 5.38 5.82
Corporation tax 1.42 1.64 2.01 2.51
Social security  contributions 14.15 14.39 14.19 13.88
Assets tax 0.48 0.51 0.60 0.59
Sales tax 18.17 17.61 16.53 20.31
International trade tax 3.99 3.65 3.74 3.08
Other taxes 0.36 0.22 0.21 0.42
GDP (according to NSO) 98.382 107.980 124.881 138.392
Source: Monthly Statistical Review of the MF, no. 49
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Denmark 52.2 50.6 1.6
Sweden 52.0 36.5 15,5
Finland 48.2 35.8 12.4
Belgium 46.0 31.1 14.9
France 45.7 26.0 19.7
Luxembourg 44.7 32.8 11.9
Holland 43.3 26.1 17.1
Austria 44.0 28.7 15.3
Greece 40.6 28.1 12.4
Italy 43.2 28.5 14.8
Germany 38.1 22.6 15.5
United Kingdom 36.0 29.8 6.2
Spain 33.7 21.6 12.1
Portugal 34.9 25.9 9.0
Ireland 33.7 29.1 4.5
Mean 42.4 30.2 12.2
Countries in transition
Czech R 40.5 23.5 17.0
Hungary 40.3 26.8 13.5
Poland 42.1 28.9 13.1
Mean 41.0 26.4 14.5
Croatia (1995) 44.4 30.2 14.1
Croatia (1998) 46.6 32.7 13.9
Sources: Revenue Statistics 1965-1997. OECD. 1998
 Monthly statistical review of the Ministry of Finance, no. 49.
3. Reducing the rate of contributions
It is necessary to lower contributions as soon as possi-
ble and bring them closer to the level in other coun-
tries.  In Croatia the total rate of contributions from
and on salaries comes to 41.2%, while in OECD
countries they are paid at an average rate of 30.2%, of
gross earnings.  This directly threatens the competi-
tiveness of Croatian exports, because the product ex-
ported is burdened with the high costs of domestic
labour.  This is not the case with VAT, because ex-
ports are zero rated, and so goods go off abroad en-
tirely exempt from VAT.  But particular mention
should be made of the fact that lowering contributions
can be done only if the process is linked with a com-
prehensive and thoroughgoing reform of the pensions
and healthcare system.
4. Lower the standard VAT rate without intro-
ducing any new rates
VAT is most efficient if it is applied to the broadest
possible base, with the application of a single rate for
all products and services (being zero rated only for
exports), and with as few exemptions as possible.  The
single rate should be gradually reduced to the level of
18-20%, without any new rates being introduced or
the zero rate being extended.  But this is directly re-
lated to the speed at which public expenditure can be
reduced.  VAT, that is, is the most productive Croa-
tian tax, and brings about 20 billion kuna in revenue
annually, constituting over 50% of total tax revenue.
Every change in the rate thus has a great impact on
changes in the amount of tax collected.  No more rates
should be introduced, neither should the scope of the
zero rate be expanded.  Enough damage was done at
the end of 1999, when the zero rate was introduced for
milk, bread, drugs and books (see more in the section
dealing with why the rate of VAT should not be
changed).  That is why, depending on the success
achieved in altering the expenditure side of the
Budget, only reductions to the single rate of VAT
should be considered.
5. Keep to the principle of taxing consumption, not
saving or investment
One of the main problems in the Croatian economy is
the low level of private investment.  However, the
reason for this state of affairs lies more in general
economic and political conditions than in the taxation
system. The Croatian taxation system, that is, is based
on the taxation of consumption, not of investment and
saving.  The income and corporation tax system is
built upon this principle.  Thus interest, dividends and
capital gains are not taxed, the institute of protective
interest is applied, which means that a company’s own
equity is not taxed, and deprecation is accelerated.
Taxation of consumption was complemented by the
introduction of VAT in its consumption form.  When
the consumption principle was introduced into the
taxation system, it was because there was a wish to
achieve tax neutrality in the making of economic de-
cisions and avoid double taxation of income.  Ac-
cordingly, in this part there is no need to change in-
come and corporation tax.
6. The corporation tax rate should not be reduced
It is not necessary to reduce the corporation tax rate,
because a large amount of relief is inherent in the cor-
poration tax system as it is.  It is already at the level of
the rate applied in a great number of countries. Apart
from that, a lot of research has shown that private in-
vestment is to a great extent more sensitive to changes
in the general political and economic environment
than to changes in tax policy.  Therefore it is more
important to maintain the stability, neutrality, sim-
plicity and transparency of the taxation system, to
contain tax evasion, than to reduce the rate at which
profits are taxed.  A stable tax policy should be just a
part of total economic and political stability.  This will
lead to both foreign and domestic investment taking
off.
7.  No new tax exemptions to be introduced, exiting
ones to be abolished
It is certainly necessary to resist pressures to introduce
additional tax exemptions and reliefs with respect to
income and corporation tax for certain industries, re-
gions or population categories.  Taxation neutrality
means that tax conditions have to be the same for all
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players in the economy.  Economic growth has to be
directed by other measures (see the section The role of
the state in the Croatian economy), not by instruments
of taxation. The exemptions that during the last few
years were indirectly introduced into the taxation
system should be abolished (for war veterans, artists,
sports people, areas of special state concern and so
on), having upset the consistence and neutrality of the
system.
8. Re-examine the amount of personal allowances
in income tax
Since as well as the personal allowances there are re-
lated allowances for dependents, an increase in them
will ensure a better welfare position for the house-
holds the most at risk.  At the same time, an additional
progressivity is thus introduced into the system, neu-
tralising the possible regressive effects of VAT, i.e.,
its characteristic of burdening the income of the poor
to a greater extent.  The World Bank recommendation
is that the annual level of personal allowance be set at
the amount of one per capita GDP.  But this amount in
our conditions depends on the extent to which VAT is
regressive. Since there are no reliable figures for this,
it is necessary to stimulate research so that the dimen-
sions of the regressivity of VAT be explored, as well
as of the whole of the taxation system, and contribut
to the growth of tax evasion.
9. Not introduce any more rates for income tax
If at all possible, the temptation to introduce a me-
dium rate for income tax should be resisted. Most
countries aim at reducing the number of rates, which
makes the system simpler and cheaper.  Welfare pol-
icy can be run much more efficiently by welfare trans-
fers, because they can be targeted more accurately to
those who really need help than with tax instruments.
10. Excise tax changes
So that the rich should pay more tax, it is not neces-
sary to reduce the number of luxury products that are
subject to excise taxation (although this measure too
can have dubious results).  One should not change the
taxes imposed on products such as petroleum deriva-
tives, tobacco and alcohol, because taxation reduces
the consumption of such demerit goods.  But it is
worth re-examining the justification of excise on non-
alcoholic beverages and lower capacity cars, which
has a direct effect on the standard of living of the
population.
11. Reduce tax evasion
The most recent research done in the Institute for
Public Finance shows that in 1996 tax evasion in
Croatia came to some 9-15% of estimated GDP, while
the share of the unofficial economy came to about
25%.  Since according to some criteria an unofficial
economy of less than 10% of GDP can be considered
small and of above 30% large, Croatia, with 25%, is
certainly among the group of countries with a large
unofficial economy. In order to eliminate this phe-
nomenon, apart from reducing the tax burden (par-
ticularly the reduction of the burden of contributions)
it is necessary to go on with measures that contribute
to increasing the efficiency, credibility and incorrupti-
bility of the tax administration.
4.2. Why a single rate VAT is best?
Almost two years have passed since the initial imple-
mentation of VAT (or PDV in Croatian).  But not
even after this amount of time have the polemics
about this new form of taxation ceased; on the con-
trary, in recent times they have actually been stepped
up. There have been many criticisms of the new tax;
however, an analysis of them would tend to show that
most of the complaints have referred to the imple-
mentation of a uniform rate of taxation.  Some taxa-
tion experts, politicians, the media and the citizenry
hold that the system of VAT with a single rate is re-
gressive, i.e. it tends to hit the poor relatively hard,
since they spend more of their income and save less.
In order to palliate the regressive effect of VAT, what
is almost always recommended is the introduction of a
large number of rates (at least two), even the intro-
duction of a zero rating for basic necessities.  In addi-
tion, representatives of some branches of the economy
(the tourist industry in particular) have been making
themselves heard, claiming that their survival is
threatened by the implementation of a single high rate
of VAT, and seeking the introduction of a lower rate.
Behind these criticisms there are a number of key
questions. Is a single rate VAT regressive?  Should its
regressive effect be corrected by the introduction of
several rates? Does VAT really put the growth of
certain branches of the economy at risk? We shall at-
tempt to give an answer to these questions in ten the-
ses.
1. The question of regressiveness is hard to define
unambiguously. It is questionable because it is not a
matter of indifference as to which base one looks at –
income or consumption, or to what period the obser-
vation relates.  VAT covering most products and
services, levied at a single rate, has by definition a
proportional effect when it is measured according to
consumption and a regressive effect when it is meas-
ured according to income.  The reason for this is that
savings as a part of income increase when income
rises.  Accordingly, when progressiveness is dis-
cussed, there should be some mention of what base it
is observed in connection with, consumption or in-
come.
The conception of regressiveness also changes when it
is looked at over the long period.  Then the burdening
of income by VAT may become proportional.  Con-
sumption taxes (which include VAT), as their very
name implies, put a burden on consumption and not
savings.  Since savings are deferred consumption,
they are, when converted into consumption, subject to
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VAT.  Thus the rich, though they save more, are in
the end not exempt from VAT. They do pay it at the
moment when they turn their savings into consump-
tion.  Thus, looking at it dynamically, not statically as
when just the household budgets of the well-to-do and
the poor are observed over the period of a single year,
the concept of regressiveness changes essentially.
When income is observed as lifetime income, then,
assuming that the whole of the income is spent by the
end of a lifetime, and that savings are not transferred
to heirs, it is equivalent to consumption.  And the pro-
portion of VAT in income is proportional, because
VAT burdens all expenses on consumption equally.
Rich man and poor man are now equally burdened by
VAT.  If income is observed over the whole of a life-
time, then, and not just as annual income, the concept
of regressiveness is questionable.  In such conditions,
VAT is a proportional burden on the income that an
individual can earn over the whole of his life.
Irrespective of this relativisation of the concept of re-
gressiveness, it nevertheless has to be admitted that
the concept of the regressiveness is habitually linked
with annual income, and it is then accurate to say that
a single rate of VAT burdens the poor more.  In their
income, consumption forms a far greater part than it
does in the income of the wealthy.  As against this, in
poorer members of the society, savings are regularly
much smaller.  However, proposals that this regres-
siveness be palliated by the introduction of a multi-
rate VAT should be resisted. For a VAT system with
several rates has a large number of drawbacks.
2. In Croatia, it is impossible precisely to define the
extent of the regressiveness. When VAT with a sin-
gle rate of 22% was introduced to replace turnover tax
with five rates in which the standard rate came to
26.5% (15% plus 10% retail sales service tax) there
was certainly a shift in relative prices.  What the final
effect of such changes in relative prices on various
categories of the population was is quite difficult to
determine unambiguously.  There is as yet no research
of the distribution of income and of the tax burden in
Croatia, and it is impossible to comprehend the re-
gressive effects of VAT.  Lack of information about
the real size of VAT regressiveness makes it more
difficult to make conclusions, and creates a fertile
ground for the work of demagogues.
Apart from this, when there is discussion of the re-
gressive effects of VAT, one should not forget that
there are other forms of tax that also apply differently
to the incomes of individuals. Unlike VAT, some of
these forms of tax, for example income tax or excise
taxes, have progressive features, and they have to be
taken into consideration when the effects of taxation
on individual income groups of the population are
considered.  Also to be considered is the effect of
“negative taxes”, i.e., subsidies (various forms of wel-
fare) that are received by the poorest members of the
population. Thus VAT should not be considered in
isolation when discussing the impact of taxation on
the population; rather, one should take into considera-
tion all forms of taxation, including their negative
components, i.e., all forms of welfare.
3. Empirical research about the regressiveness of
VAT largely bears out the thesis that it cannot be
used to reduce differences.  In Ireland, for example,
it has been ascertained that in absolute terms the rich
spend twice as much on food as the poor, although the
poor spend relatively more of their income than the
rich on food.  Accordingly, the zero rating of food in
Ireland provides twice as much a tax break for the rich
as it does for the poor.  A Swedish study showed that
the abolition of the zero rating for food would mostly
benefit single people in the high income groups, be-
cause they usually buy more expensive food. In addi-
tion, the demand for books, newspapers and maga-
zines is very income elastic. In other words, the rich
buy more books and other forms of printed matter,
and a cut in the rate for publications would make
VAT still more regressive.
4. The introduction of several rates requires a de-
tailed definition of taxable products. If vegetables
are taxed at a reduced rate, does this mean that fresh,
canned and frozen vegetables are taxed at a single rate
or different rates?  Should there be a same rate of
VAT for lettuce and for artichokes?  Nor are all kinds
of lettuce the same, and it is then necessary to define
whether there is a need to embark on a further dis-
tinction of products.   The process of defining the
products for different rates gets very complex and
gives rise to further discussion, most often about bor-
derline products that in their nature can be taxable in
terms of two different rates.  The definition of prod-
ucts requires a professional and intelligent tax admini-
stration capable of giving clear, convincing and well-
supported explanations of its decisions in public dis-
cussions about rates that tend to become very heated.
Thus the introduction of several rates complicates a
tax administration and makes it more expensive than a
system with a single rate.
5. Unclear definition of products opens up the door
to tax evasion.  This relates to all products that are
not unequivocally defined.   Taxpayers will attempt to
put them in lower rate categories.  The use of several
rates will open the door to corruption and lobbying,
for many will wish to persuade the state to put their
product in the lower rate category.  Thus powerful
lobbies will get into the VAT system.
6. Increasing the number of rates will lead to an
increase in the administrative costs of collecting
the tax.  A state that uses several rates of VAT will
have to have more civil servants for the processing of
complex tax returns than a state with a single rate
VAT.  In addition, the costs of calculating and paying
VAT in the companies will also rise.   The well
known taxation expert and long-term director of the
Fiscal Department of the IMF, Vito Tanzi, said in
1993 that with a transition from one to two rates, the
costs of VAT administration went up five times, and
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with a change to three rates, ten times.  The increased
costs of the tax administration and of the compliance
costs of the corporate sector in the collection of VAT
with multiple rates should certainly not be neglected
in discussion of introducing a lower rate of VAT.
7. Lower VAT rates are no guarantee of lower
prices.  Lower rates of VAT in tourism, for drugs and
food do not automatically mean a lowering of prices
for these products.  In a free market, prices are formed
according to supply and demand.  Traders set their
prices according to the elasticity of demand, that is,
according to what the market will bear, irrespective of
the rate of taxation. Accordingly, a lower rate of VAT
is no guarantee that the poor will pay lower prices, nor
is a lower VAT in tourism a panacea for all the prob-
lems in this branch of the economy.  It would be very
nice indeed if all the problems in the Croatian tourist
industry could be solved through the introduction of a
lower rate of VAT.
8. Various rates of VAT distort consumer prefer-
ences. It is usually said that lower rates for food
should be introduced because the poor spend more on
food in their household budgets than the rich.  But the
rich spend also on milk, meat and oil. Why should
such products be taxed at a lower rate, the rich thus
being helped just like the poor?  The introduction of
lower taxes for food will indirectly subsidise the rich.
As against this, taxing luxury products at higher rates
will discourage the poor from occasionally upgrading
their consumption with the more expensive product.
Do the poor have no right to buy luxury products? Is
the purchase of luxury products considered the exclu-
sive right of the rich, with enough money to pay high
taxes on such products as well? Why introduce such
discrimination into consumption?  The poor can be
helped much more effectively with the aid of direct
transfers from the budget or by a progressive income
tax.  Total income formed in this way (earned income
plus welfare payments) will help the poor, in a single
rate VAT system, to adjust their consumption to their
own preferences, and not to the rates of taxation.
9. Lower rates of VAT mean less revenue to the
national budget.   In such a situation, the state would
very likely be forced to increase the standard rate of
VAT in order to obtain revenue adequate for its own
inelastic expenses. An increase in the standard rate
would lead to a still greater wave of discontent, for it
would be applied to the greatest number of products
and services.
Apart from this, today about 50% of budgetary reve-
nue is derived from VAT (Table 1), and a small shift
in the rates would bring about great changes in the
level of tax revenues.  For this reason the Croatian
Ministry of Finance has to be extremely cautious
when making any decision about the number and the
amount of rates.  Reducing the rates for some prod-
ucts would mean a reduction of taxation revenue or
would lead to the standard rate being put up from 22%
to some higher level, or would lead to an increase in
other types of taxes, or would result in a serious re-
duction in budgetary expenditures.
10. The EU is tending towards a smaller number of
rates of VAT. Many say that in the area surrounding
the Croatian economy, mainly implying the EU, a
system of VAT with several rates is employed. This is
indeed true.  Of the EU countries, only Denmark has a
single rate system, and of OECD countries, only Ja-
pan and New Zealand have a single rate system (Table
2). But the EU is a community of fifteen states with
different tax systems.  Coordination of their tax sys-
tems is underway, and comprises a painful and long-
term process in which each country feels that interfer-
ence with its taxation system is an attack on its sover-
eignty.  However, the EU recommends its members
the reduction of numbers of rates of VAT so that there
are only two: a standard one of 15% and a reduced
one, of not lower than 5%. The EU too, then, is tend-
ing towards a single rate, and the end result of this
long lasting process is certain to be a single rate.
This is possible to state with a great amount of cer-
tainty because contemporary taxation theory has on
the whole unambiguously and unanimously opted for
the adoption of single-rate VAT with a small number
of exemptions and zero ratings and a broad tax base.
EU countries introduced VAT in the sixties and sev-
enties, when the attitude towards a single rate was not
so explicit.  Their aim was that the tax burden should
be as similar as possible to that with the sales tax in
order to facilitate acceptance of a completely new
form of taxation of consumption, a form that until
then had never been implemented.  In Croatia a taxa-
tion system founded on the experience of EU coun-
tries should be retained, and VAT in its best form be
continued, which certainly means a system with a sin-
gle rate.
Convinced that the regressiveness of VAT can be pal-
liated with the application of a number of rates, the
transition countries, guided primarily by political mo-
tives, have largely introduced multi-rate VAT systems
(Table 3).  Unfortunately, they have not paid attention
to foreign experience about the drawbacks of multi-
rate systems, and they are now burdened with a num-
ber of problems, of the kind entailed by such systems
on the countries that were the first to introduce VAT.
Finally, it should be said that the comparison of a tax
in several different countries does not have a great
deal of point.  A correct approach would involve a
comparison of the entire taxation system, and also of
the welfare system.
Conclusion
Although we are aware of the regressive effect of a
single-rate VAT, at the same time we are convinced
that VAT should not be used to attain objectives that
it cannot address in the most satisfactory manner.  The
aim of the tax is to gather revenue by taxing con-
sumption, not to carry out measures of welfare or in-
dustrial policy. Its regressive effects must be corrected
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by other instruments of the fiscal system, such as di- rect transfers from the budget in the form of welfare
aid to the poor, and progressive income tax and other
forms of taxation.  Economic theory and practice
show that the application of target measures that are
aimed at a clearly selected group of citizens is much
more effective and cheaper for the budget than gen-
eral, unselective measures that, intended to help just
some, also assist those who do not need help.  The
introduction of several rates of VAT will not do away
with its regressive effect, but will also obliquely sub-
sidise the rich.  A several-rate system is a clumsy
way of palliating the regressive effects of a single-
rate VAT system.  The good features of a single-rate
VAT, such as neutrality and collection efficiency
should not be sacrificed to introduce a much more
complicated form with several rates that will intro-
duce new distortions in to the market and addition-
ally exacerbate the problem of the optimal allocation
of resources.  The aim of reducing the overall tax
burden, which cames in 1997 to as high as 50% of
GDP (expenditures of general government as a per-
centage of GDP) and which is still rising can be
achieved by other  changes: reduction of the standard
rate of VAT from 22% to a lower rate or by reducing
the contributions rate, which greatly increases the
costs of labour. But a precondition for a permanent
reduction in taxation pressure is a reduction in budg-
etary expenditure.   This relates in particularly to the
great, accumulated problems in the pension and
health-care insurance funds. Beginning to make re-
forms in these areas will have a crucial importance
for a reduction in national expenditure, which will in
turn allow a reduction in the tax burden.
Table 1. BUDGETARY CENTRAL GOVERNMENT TAX  REVENUE
Current prices, 000 000 kuna
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Tax revenue 22.377,48 26.505,35 28.530,43 31.338,17 40.327,49
    Income tax 3.211,61 3.497,59 4.216,93 4.102,23 4.915,10
    Profits tax 591,59 1.009,07 1.271,18 1.785,26 2.461,15
    Real estate sales tax 117,67 141,76 171,78 242,70 270,92
    Tax on sales of goods and services 14.920,74 17.762,70 18.895,16 20.538,00 27.968,26
       VAT 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 20.228,23
       Turnover tax 13.107,16 12.802,26 13.504,37 15.133,17 1.972,05
       Excise 1.813,58 4.960,44 5.390,79 5.404,83 5.767,98
    International trade tax 3.486,77 3.922,48 3.942,44 4.639,99 4.256,33
    Other taxes 49,11 171,76 32,94 29,99 455,74
Structure of tax revenue 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
 Tax revenue 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,00 100,00
    Income tax 14,4 13,2 14,8 13,09 12,19
    Profits tax 2,6 3,8 4,5 5,70 6,10
    Real estate sales tax 0,5 0,5 0,6 0,77 0,67
    Tax on sales of goods and services 66,7 67,0 66,2 65,54 69,35
       VAT 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 50,16
       Turnover tax 58,6 48,3 47,3 48,29 4,89
       Excise 8,1 18,7 18,9 17,25 14,30
    International trade tax 15,6 14,8 13,8 14,81 10,55
    Other taxes 0,2 0,6 0,1 0,10 1,13
As percentage of GDP 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
 Tax revenue 25,6 26,9 26,4 25,5 29,7
    Income tax 3,7 3,6 3,9 3,3 3,6
    Profits tax 0,7 1,0 1,2 1,5 1,8
    Real estate sales tax 0,1 0,1 0,2 0,2 0,2
    Tax on sales of goods and services 17,1 18,1 17,5 16,7 20,6
       VAT 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 14,9
       Turnover tax 15,0 13,0 12,5 12,3 1,5
       Excise 2,1 5,0 5,0 4,4 4,3
    International trade tax 4,0 4,0 3,7 3,8 3,1
    Other taxes 0,1 0,2 0,0 0,0 0,3
GDP 87.441,20 98.382,00 107.980,60 122.904,50 135.645,20
Source: Ministry of Finance, Republic of Croatia
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Table 2. Current VAT rates in OECD countries
Country Reduced rate Standard rate Higher rate















New Zealand 4 - 12,5
Norway 0 23




Turkey 1;8 15 23;40
United Kingdom 6 0;2,5;8 17,5
1) A rate of 16% is applied in the Austrian tax enclaves
Mittelberg and Junghollen
2) In some outlying parts of the country the taxation rate is
reduced by 30%.
3) 3% up to March 1997; 5% from April 1, 1997
4) For long-term lease of commercial property, standard
rate VAT is collected on 60% of the value of the prop-
erty.
5) From July 1996 the reduced rate of 12% has been ap-
plied to restaurant services and for some food products
(and from October 1 expanded to cover other food
products).
6) Standard rate applied at a reduced value of some art-
works, ancient and collectors’ objects, which makes
the effective rate 2.5%.
Source: "Consumption Tax Trends", OECD, Paris, 1997.
Table 3.    VAT rates in Central and Eastern Europe
Country Reduced rate Standard
Bulgaria - 22









Source:  Cnosen, Sijbren (1999) in Rose, Manfred "Tax
Reform for Countries in Transition to Market Ecomies”
economies", Lucius & Lucius, Stuttgart, 1999.
For Slovenia: "Denar", vol .IX, 15. June 1999.
4.3 The Tax Administration
Basics
The efficacy of a tax system depends not only on
appropriate tax laws, but also on the efficiency and
degree of integration of the tax administration. A
low level of budgetary resources collected can be
ascribed either to the incompetence of the tax ad-
ministration to carry out its task or to its greater or
lesser degree of corruption. However carefully the
tax laws might be framed, they cannot lessen the
gap between the tax administration and the tax-
payer, a tax administration made up of professional,
responsible people thus being the most important
condition in realising the tax potential of a country.
Tax laws or a tax policy are good to the extent that
the tax administration is up to its task.   A tax sys-
tem cannot be better than its administration, but
even the best tax administration will be unsuccess-
ful in turning a bad into an effective taxation sys-
tem.  Many ambitious tax reforms have fallen down
because of the inefficiency of their taxation admini-
strations.  Without constant reorganisation of the tax
administration, without day-to-day improvements in
the methods of its administration, it is almost im-
possible to expect tax reforms to be effective and
feasible.
The situation
Although it can be said that from the points of view
of organisation, personnel and fulfilment of its tasks
the Croatian tax administration and in particular the
control service in no way lags behind similar serv-
ices in the world, it will nevertheless be necessary
to work upon stepping up its efficiency and on up-
dating it. This is the more important that in Croatia,
as in most other countries in transition, the share of
taxation that is gained from large, mainly state
companies is reducing, and it has to be made up
with taxes gathered from private, mainly smaller
firms, and individuals.  With a relatively low level
of taxation morality and the unaccustomedness of
taxpayers to paying taxes, the tax administration
and the inspection service do not have very easy
tasks.  Equally important is the question of the fur-
ther professional training of those employed in the
revenue service.
Reasons
In order to manage the changeover to the market
economy, apart from privatisation, price liberalisa-
tion, limitation of the influence of the state on eco-
nomic flows and other necessary activities, it is im-
portant to develop a contemporary tax system, which
is to a great extent reflected in changes in the work
and organisation of the taxation administration. It is
held that the building of an efficient and comprehen-
sive taxation system, in which the tax administration
has a very important place, is one of the most com-
plex and most serious of the macroeconomic difficul-
ties to be met with by countries in transition.  In all
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countries in transition a great fall in GDP has been
recorded, which, when combined with insufficient
efficiency on the part of the tax administration, tends
to result in alarming budgetary shortfalls. This results
in pressure to increase the rate of existing taxes, and
the introduction of new, frequently off-the-cuff, taxes.
This motley situation, known as tax system patches, is
largely the result of the incompetence of the tax ad-
ministration in these countries to gather taxes that do
exist, which leads to the incessant need to prescribe
new taxes and carry out changes in the tax system,
and to an almost permanent state of tax reform.
In Croatia, as in almost all countries in transition,
there is a large tax disproportion brought about by a
number of factors.  First, the basic tax rates are rela-
tively high.   A large number of newly founded firms
are headed in the direction of tax evasion, inveterate
as it is, and working in the unofficial economy, by
high tax rates.  Secondly, contributions on wages are
used for the financing of welfare benefits.  Since these
contributions are a burden on the employer, and tend
to discourage his entrepreneurial energies, they make
employment in the official economy more difficult
and encourage work in the unofficial economy.
Thirdly, tax exemptions, tax relief, various kinds of
tax rates make the work of the tax administration
more difficult and distort the allocation of sources of
income.  A key precondition for an efficient taxation
administration is a tax structure in which there will be
a very strict limitation on exemptions and in which
there will not be any differences in the tax approach
to individual branches of industry, regions, individu-
als.  Stepping up tax efficiency and reducing evasion
will almost certainly result in the feedback of being
able to reduce the rates of taxation.
Not less important is the question of an efficient taxa-
tion administration.  In a market economy it is based
on the principle of the voluntary compliance of a large
number of taxpayers. The tax administration should
be organised around individual actions (such as the
work of assessing and monitoring taxes, keeping rec-
ords or reviewing), rather than being linked to a par-
ticular tax or group of taxpayers.  In general, it is nec-
essary to make tax assessment, collection and docu-
mentation more efficient.  A tax administration must
be up to the large number of taxpayers, many of
which, especially private firms in production or serv-
ices, are apt to find all kinds of ways of avoiding
paying taxes.  A better coverage can start with special
attention to the large taxpayers whose taxes make up
most of the tax revenues. This does not mean, of
course, that the results of successful monitoring of
large taxpayers can excuse neglecting medium sized
and smaller taxpayers, because then one might find a
reduction in their tax compliance, which would result
in a reduction of the funds gathered as a whole.  The
next step should be stepping up inspection and activi-
ties directed to those who do not make tax returns or
do not pay tax.
In Croatia, within the framework of reform of the en-
tire fiscal system, reform has been carried out of the
bodies charged with the assessment, collection and
the control of the collection of tax revenue, that is, a
single Tax Administration has been founded, with lo-
cal offices and branches throughout the country.
Since the founding of the Tax Administration and the
Financial Police, problems have shown up in organ-
isational and functional points of view, limiting the
work of the tax administration and increasing its
costs.  Shortcomings with respect to the independence
of the Tax Administration have been seen, the number
of local offices and the overlapping of competences
with the Financial Police in carrying out inspection
and control duties.  Particular attention has to be de-
voted to the inspection of the large taxpayers.
Changes require employees with appropriate qualifi-
cations and incentives on the basis of a better system
of rewards for work. Remedying these irregularities
and shortcomings, and undertaking measures to raise
the efficiency of the tax administration will help the
Tax Administration to become a smoother working
whole in a quantitative and a qualitative sense, and
will reduce its costs.
Recommendations
The most important question to do with reducing the
costs and increasing the efficiency of the work of the
taxation administration is how to make new forms of
organisation and new procedures acceptable in condi-
tions of the existence of a certain tradition and of
practices that are reinforced on a daily basis.  Reform
of the organisational structure of the tax department
can be of crucial importance for the strengthening of
the tax administration.  A well thought-out organisa-
tional structure can lay the foundations for an efficient
tax administration that will reduce the opportunities
for tax evasion to the smallest possible extent, and
encourage voluntary shouldering of the tax burden.
To encourage efficiency, the organisational structure
has to be linked with the objectives of the tax depart-
ment. These targets of contemporary tax departments
today include reduction of the costs of compliance,
and ordinary activities such as collecting appropriate
revenue in line with the law.  In the last few years
there has been a rise in interest in the reorganisation
of the structure of the tax departments, which has par-
tially been prompted by the growing concern for the
protection of the rights of the taxpayer.
PART FIVE
5.1 The unofficial economy
Basics
The unofficial economy (UE) includes all kinds of
activities, from almost legal transactions to totally
criminal actions, while it usually implies actions that
for various reasons take place outside the framework
of the official economy. Other terminology is also
used: the informal economy, the parallel economy, the
black economy and so on.  It includes tax evasion,
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avoidance, side-stepping, abusing or degrading regu-
lations, and the ancillary efforts needed to hide these
unlawful activities from the authorities.  In the event
of failure to respect the fiscal regulations, tax evasion
and fraud, this concerns the unreported economy;
when the income made is not covered by the national
accounts it is the unregistered economy; abuses of
public position to obtain some profit make up the cor-
rupt economy; and activities in which the regulations
relating to the ban on extortion, financial fraud,
smuggling, organised crime and theft of state property
are broken are examples of the illegal economy. The
size of and changes in the unofficial economy are im-
portant because they can be a source of independent
economic changes, and affect the direction taken by
and the strength of economic policy.
The situation
According to the project The Unofficial Economy in
the RC carried out by the Institute for Public Finance
Zagreb (Financial Practice, 20:1-2, 1997) the share of
the UE in Croatian GDP in 1995 amounted to at least
25%.  Data defined according to sector are in line with
this share and in 1994 ranged from 8 per cent in in-
dustry to 64 per cent in commerce.  In the period from
1990 to 1996, two sub-periods can be clearly distin-
guished.  During the first, which lasted until the end
of 1993, according to all available data, the share of
the UE in GDP increased.  It is not possible to make a
final decision about the second, which started in 1994,
because although some indicators suggest there was a
fall, other important indicators show a rise in the share
of the UE.  The actually calculated share of the UE is
certainly large, and is also perhaps underrated; be-
cause of methodological problems, some occupations
in which the UE tends to figure very strongly were not
covered (personal services, construction).  This large
share will in all likelihood continue in the foreseeable
future, because the inherited tradition, a transition
process that has gone on with intensive sector and in-
stitutional restructuring, the great impact of the state
in the economy (particularly in the privatisation proc-
ess), tax pressure and the growth of new enterprise all
tend to support the UE.
Reasons
• The growth of the UE in the economy as a whole
(measured by the national accounting system) up
to 1993 might have been prompted by the fall in
real incomes, high inflation, the existence of par-
allel means of payment in domestic transactions, a
high tax burden and the war, while the fall in the
UE after 1993 might have been brought about by
the lightening of the tax burden on consumption,
income and profits.
• As for growth of the UE in industry, agriculture
and trade up to 1993, it is assumed that it was af-
fected by the lack of financial control (war, the
establishment of a new state with only nascent in-
stitutions), fall in production and real incomes
(with people turning to the informal commercial
sector), the transition (reduction in employment in
the formal sector going hand in hand with privati-
sation and restructuring), and the search for alter-
native and cheaper supplies. The fall of the UE
since 1994 might be accounted for by the growth
in financial control, the reduction of the tax rates,
the restructuring of the big retail chains, real rise
in incomes and so on. The renewed, unexpected,
growth of UE in 1995, in spite of stepped-up
checks by the Financial Police and the growth in
real incomes in the population at large, could be
explained by a high rate of growth of personal ex-
penditure, a fall in the prices of imported as com-
pared with home-produced goods, structural
changes in consumption and increased demand for
durables.
• The existence of the UE in international trade
could be explained by things that occur in other
transitional countries (slow economic growth,
high unemployment, a high marginal rate of taxa-
tion, and a high level of public spending). In
Croatia, however, the following factors were par-
ticularly prominent: inefficiency in the privatisa-
tion process, problems related to the achievement
of the economy of scale, shortcomings in the legal
system (adjustment of the legal system to the
market economy has not yet come to a close) and
weak penal measures for the suppression of illegal
activities.
• The causes of the UE in privatisation might be a)
the concept of privatisation chosen, which because
of privileged sales had unfavourable consequences
(the centralisation of all decisions about the trans-
formation and privatisation at the level of the na-
tional administration; the nationalisation of a large
part of the social capital; the choice of important
buyers on the principle of political loyalties); b)
the concentration of decisions about privatisation
in the hands of the central governmental agency
charged with putting through the process, which
tended to result in corruption and the like; c) the
original legislative approach left many important
questions undefined and unregulated, and things
were solved as they arose (the Transformation Act
was amended six times); d) the lack of any appro-
priate computer system of monitoring privatisa-
tion in the first years of its implementation; e) the
impossibility of broad social and political control
of the national institutions that were under direct
control of the ruling party.  Along with these, the
following also had an effect on the scope of the
UE in privatisation: a) the war; b) the inheritance
of managerial socialist self-management (in fact,
delay in the privatisation of the banking system
facilitated the unexpected success of the old
managerial structure in privatisation, and also the
consolidation of elements of the old banking man-
agement structure); c) the political design of
Croatian capitalism, with the ruling party playing
a role in meritocratic privatisation, in the political
selection of owners, open nepotism, the conse-
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quence being the cohabitation of the UE and unof-
ficial politics, politics outside the reach of proper,
constitutionally founded, institutional supervision.
• The weaknesses of the Croatian post-socialist
state, such as lack of professionalism and incom-
petence among clerks and officials, corruption,
favouritism, and particularly the overloading of
the administrative, inspectorial and judicial
mechanisms certainly had something to do with
the existence of the UE.
• A special impetus is also probably given by the
large number of small firms that are more apt to
work within the UE, particularly in branches any-
way prone to the UE mode of existence (in trade,
financial and other services, construction). It is
interesting that a large number of informal entre-
preneurial activities took place in firms that be-
long to the official economy.  The reason for this
is a liberal regime and the low cost of registering
companies in the interim period between the
Yugoslav Companies Law and the new Croatian
Companies Law of 1996.
Recommendations
Measures to suppress the UE in privatisation should
be taken by: a) the government, dismissing the offi-
cials responsible; b) the police, with efficient inquiries
when there is suspicion of some criminal acts; c) the
judiciary, handling indictments rapidly and efficiently.
Measures against the UE in privatisation necessarily
imply: a) clearer and more precise laws, which will
stop arbitrariness and discretionary interpretation of
the law on the part of the administration; b) the politi-
cal power of the authorities publicly to condemn
negative actions, and an effective judiciary; c) accel-
eration and speedy conclusion of the process of priva-
tisation, thus avoiding the long term consequences or
risks of corruption, fraud, bribery and so on; d) more
detailed scholarly research into UE in privatisation,
which requires in turn free access to data in appropri-
ate state institutions (ministries, funds, agencies).
Economic policy  directed to the suppression of the
UE has to: 1) cut taxes and customs duties (to the ex-
tent the Budget will permit); 2) selectively reduce
regulations; 3) reduce the role of the public sector,
i.e., the state, in the economy, and liberalise the econ-
omy; 4) prompt the determination of the size of the
UE in the economy as a whole, and in individual in-
dustries.
To reduce the UE it will be necessary to concentrate
on: 1) explicating, making more precise, and coordi-
nating the laws and the regulations; 2) giving the
courts greater independence and making them better
equipped; 3) an improvement in and better access to
statistics; 4) improving the organisation, efficiency,
professionalism of and cooperation among bodies of
the state; 5) reduction of the role of the state, liberali-
sation of the economy, a more rational spending of
public money, better public sector services; 6) com-
pletion of the reform of the pensions system; 7) a
break with paternalistic capitalism; 8) control of pri-
vatisation; 9) strengthening of democratic forms of
control.
While attempting to reduce the UE it is more impor-
tant to do away with its causes than penalise the
symptoms, with the institutional sphere (the relation





Welfare transfers are budgetary and extra-budgetary
allocations of funds from the public sector laid down
for certain institutions and levels of government for
welfare, retirement and health insurance, unemploy-
ment insurance.
The situation
High and growing expenditures  for social insurance
and protection in Croatia are the consequence of the
large number of persons who depend on assistance
from the state (pensioners, the unemployed and, in
general, economically inactive persons). Croatia, like
ex-Yugoslavia after all, was not a classic planned-
economy. It can be said that until the beginning of the
transition process, unemployment and low levels of
qualifications and education were the most important
determinants of poverty. In other words, the danger of
marginalisation was directly linked to exclusion from
the world of work.  If employment or unemployment
is one of the determinants of the need for welfare
benefits, another one is the amount of the wage
earned.  In many cases low and irregular wages are an
important cause of poverty.
Reasons
An analysis of welfare in Croatia is difficult because
of the lack of any reliable statistical indicators, and
the inconsistency of the figures that are available.
Welfare programmes brought in by the new Welfare
Law have in theory many desirable features.  Never-
theless, the indicators available make it impossible to
tell how effective they are in practice.  Only on the
basis of a household spending poll or some other spe-
cial research programme into the level and structure
of household spending will it be possible to determine
how much welfare is really successfully directed to
those who are truly poor and to what measure it helps
them to avoid actual indigence.  Thus for the moment
in Croatia there are no data enabling the vertical and
horizontal efficacy of the system, and one has to re-
frain from making any final appraisal.
Public Sector Economics
The state of affairs, problems, and possible solutions
IO
Recommendations
The key question of economic policy is how to bring
employment in the unofficial economy into the legal
framework and thus expand the base of taxpayers.
This presumes re-examination of the factors that lay
behind the move to work in the unofficial economy.
The small number of new jobs in the official economy
and moving to work in the grey zone can largely be
attributed to the high level of labour costs (especially
the high rates of contribution for retirement and
healthcare insurance, together almost 40% of gross
pay).  The situation could be improved if the total rate
of contributions were cut down to about 20-25%,
which would correspond to the situation in OECD
countries, although this would mean certain reduc-
tions of welfare rights for a given period of time.  In-
creased hiring in the official economy, which would
mean greater employment and make it easier to bear
the burdens of financing public needs, would palliate
the negative consequences of this reduction.
6.2 Financing the system for employment
and reduction of unemployment
Basics
The liquidation and bankruptcy of many companies
and the dismissals of large numbers of employed peo-
ple combined with very limited opportunities to find a
new job have resulted in an unemployment explosion
in Croatia.  Apart from the very large number of un-
employed, there is a constant rise in the share of the
long-term unemployed, i.e., those who have been
waiting for more than two years for a job; almost a
third of all unemployed fall within this category.
The situation
The problem could be summed up in two main
groups: the reduced opportunities for employment,
and the relatively large number of claimants of finan-
cial benefits, so that almost all the funds available are
used for meeting claims to benefits, and there is very
left over to pay for the active employment policy,
their result being that there is very little going on in
the way of training, retraining, additional qualifica-
tions and so on.
According to data about the structure of unemploy-
ment, in spite of the much higher rates of unemploy-
ment among the young, they in fact make up only a
little more than one third of total unemployment. Per-
sons between 25 and 50 make up 54.3% of all unem-
ployed.  For this reason, the unemployment reduction
policy should not be directed only towards solving the
problems of the young who find themselves outside
the world of work.  If the policy is designed to over-
come certain unfavourable conditions, then it should
be directed towards those groups that make up the
majority of the people who suffer from lack of em-
ployment.  On the other hand, if the point of the pol-
icy is to reduce the costs of obviating the unfavour-
able conditions, then it should be directed to those
groups that have the highest risk of unemployment.
Although cash benefits during unemployment are
small in absolute terms, the ratio between benefits and
the average wage is approximately the same as in de-
veloped industrial countries. If the benefits were much
higher, it would create a negative motivation about
job seeking, and spring an unemployment trap.
Reasons
Although in the last almost thirty years (from 1971 to
1998) the number of unemployed in Croatia has more
than quintupled, the number of people in receipt of
cash benefits and health insurance has increased even
more, so that their proportion in overall unemploy-
ment has also increased considerably.  For this reason,
in the total resources of the employment system, the
share taken by the provision of benefits for the unem-
ployed has greatly risen, while the share of resources
for preparation for employment has dropped, and al-
most all available resources in the system are spent on
meeting the claims of the unemployed.  In the total
expenditure of the employment system in 1998, the
proportion taken by benefits was 98.5%. The share of
resources allocated to preparation for employment
was reduced by 57% since 1971, to 1.5% in 1998.
Recommendations
The labour market has the most important role in de-
termining the living standards of the citizens of Croa-
tia, as well as in the amounts and kinds of benefit that
are supposed to be provided by the welfare organisa-
tions.  A flexible labour market (with as few as possi-
ble restrictions relating to the supply of and demand
for labour) with economic development can ensure a
high degree of employment and a rise in wages.  This
would reduce the pressure on the system of welfare
benefits, reduce the number of people who want to
take early retirement and so on.  An insufficiently
flexible labour market and limitations in professional
and geographical mobility only exacerbate the prob-
lems of poverty and social exclusion, and add to the
burden of welfare, which is connected to the eco-
nomic crisis.  As well as increasing opportunities for
employment, it is essential to improve the position of
the unemployed by building up a suitable system of
welfare for the unemployed.
Through measures of the active employment policy -
training, re-training, additional training, professional
qualification, the qualifications structure of job seek-
ers will be improved, which will increase their occu-
pational mobility and ability to become employed. At
the same time, education will help the unemployed to
retain the skills and knowledge they acquired earlier,
forestall the possible unemployment of the still em-
ployed, and additionally coordinate supply and de-
mand in the labour market.  Mainly because of the
lack of resources, training programmes for the em-
ployed and unemployed in Croatia are carried out in
IP
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very low volume.  These measures in Croatia, to the
greatest possible extent, should be aimed at the 15 to
24 age group, in which there is the highest rate of un-
employment (and in which there is likely to be the
greatest return on investment in human resources).
Investment in people has to become profitable for
employers, more profitable than capital investment.
Secondly, to the greatest possible extent again, educa-
tion and training programmes should be oriented to-
wards jobs and qualifications for which there will be
the most demand in the future, that is, the emphasis
should be on qualification for known employers.  This
policy should be under constant review, so as to en-
sure its efficiency, so that the benefit should be
greater than the cost, and the return greater than alter-
native investment in other purposes.  When once the
active employment policy comes to life, it is neces-
sary to include in the training and additional training
programmes an increasing number of workers and
find ways of motivating them to accept new know-
how and skills (increase the amount of benefit and/or
extend the length of the period of benefit for those
willing to undergo training).
Because of the problem of unemployment in Croatia,
and from the experience of other countries in transi-
tion, it will be necessary for a certain period to in-
crease the total sums available for employment (for
active measures, preparation for employment, re- and
additional qualification, as well as the passive meas-
ures, the provision of benefits) to 2 to 3 per cent of
GDP.
6.3 Reforms of the pension  system
Basics
In the whole world, pensions systems are in crisis, but
there is an essential difference between the crises in
the pensions systems of the industrial states, devel-
oping countries, and transitional countries.  While the
crises in the highly developed countries are still quite
mild, the pensions systems in the countries in transi-
tion are well nigh bankrupt.
The situation
The existing public systems of pension insurance in
the countries in transition are financed from current
revenue and are not capable of meeting their obliga-
tions to the very large number of pensioners.  Pen-
sioners individually receive very small pensions, but
the contributions for retirement insurance are ex-
tremely high (about 30%, and about 20% more for
other kinds of contributions), which quite inevitably
leads to shifts into the grey economy, to working “on
the black”.  The pension system in Croatia is in a des-
perate situation, and as in other transition countries, it
is saved from total collapse only by the fact that pen-
sions are only partially, or not at all, made to keep up
with rises in wages and the cost of living.
Reasons
There are two fundamental reasons for retirement in-
surance problems: demographic and financial.  These
reasons are in fact closely interconnected. In general,
the ageing of the population (a phenomenon present in
all developed countries, which needs to be separated
from biological ageing) is a fundamental cause of the
increased pressure upon the resources of the pension
funds.  This phenomenon cannot be tolerated by any
economy over the long run. In 1991 the proportion of
people over 65 in Croatia was 13.1% (10.1 for men,
16.0 for women). For this reason there is an inevitable
trend towards the deepening of the gap between in-
flow and outflow, which can be solved only by greater
contributions, or by the differences being made up
from the Budget at the expense of other items.  Nei-
ther one nor the other is desirable.  Additionally, in a
generational solidarity retirement system (unfunded or
pay as you go) there is no direct link whatsoever be-
tween retirement contributions and ultimate receipts,
since all payments are spent on the maintenance of
today’s generation of pensioners, and do not guaran-
tee even the existing level of pension in the future, let
alone any raising of the retirement standard of living.
Contributions for the generational solidarity system
distort not only the number of hours that an individual
works, but all other features of the labour supply, like
choice of profession, place of work, and investment of
effort.  Contributions also distort the forms and man-
ners of payment for work, there being moves away
from monetary receipts, which are taxed, to perqui-
sites like paid holidays, winter holidays, use of an of-
ficial car and so on), better work conditions and the
like.  At the same time, if the pensions system is very
liberal (which it is not in Croatia) common sense and
everyday experience say that persons who expect a
high degree of income replacement will save very lit-
tle for their retirement, and the system thus has a
negative effect on national savings.
With the adjustment to a market economy from the
early nineties in Croatia the following have come to
the fore: (1) increased early retirement and disability
retirement, “solving” the unemployment problem, as
well as war-related disability retirement; 2) the avoid-
ance of payment of contributions because of the
flourishing of the illegal sector, moonlighting, a poor
civil service, corruption and so on; (3) delays in the
payment of pensions and in indexing because of lack
of funds in the Budget.
In the 1980 to 1998 period, the number of insureds
has decreased radically, by almost 400,000, while the
number of retirees has more than doubled, so that the
ratio of contribution payers to pensioners has deterio-
rated greatly. While at the end of 1980 there was one
pensioner for every four people paying contributions,
the ratio has deteriorated to such an extent that at the
end of 1998 it was 1.48.  This means that every three
insureds support two pensioners, which is extremely
unfavourable. There are most old-age pensioners in
the total number of pensioners. This number increased
extremely rapidly in the early 90s, when pensioning
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people off was a way of managing the welfare status
of people who lost their jobs because of the war or
because of restructuring in the economy and who
were eligible to retire, retire early, or purchase senior-
ity.
In the 60s, 70s and at the beginning of the 80s, the
average pension came to between 50 and 60% of the
average wage, while the golden years for pensioners
were in the 1987-1990 period, with the average pen-
sion coming to about three quarters of the average
wage.  After this came a fall of wages, but the cut in
pensions was still more marked, and in 1993 the aver-
age pension was only slightly more than half the aver-
age wage. In the mid-90s, the growth in pensions
continued to fall behind the rise in wages, so that the
average pension is now constantly less than 50% of
the average wage. With respect to kind of pension, in
1998 the largest were disability pensions, at 1306
kuna a month (48.7% of the average wage).
Although they figure relatively little in the total reve-
nue of the Retirement Fund, transfers from the Budget
were in the range of 0.3% of GDP (1995) to 1.98%
(1997), the Retirement Fund thus becoming one of the
most important generators of the deficit of the central
and also the consolidated national Budget.  The situa-
tion deteriorated still further in 1998 when transfers to
the Retirement Fund came to about 2.75% of GDP.
Croatia has actually for some time seen a rise in the
Budget. A large Budget puts the brakes on economic
growth, particularly in a country like Croatia with an
undeveloped financial market and a weak inflow of
foreign investment capital.
Recommendations
In a reform of the Croatian retirement insurance sys-
tem, three levels of insurance are foreseen: two
obligatory levels (the first is of generational solidarity
for all employees to which go contributions of 16.5%
of gross wages, and a second level of capitalised sav-
ings for persons younger than 40, for which 5% of
gross wages are set aside, the funds gathered being
placed in privately managed pension funds), and a
third level, of voluntary capitalised insurance for
those who want to pay even more retirement insur-
ance and obtain higher pensions on retirement.  Apart
from that, the reform foresees a gradual raising of the
retirement age, an expansion of the accounting period
for pension rights (which should also be a stimulus to
paying contributions, for then a pension will depend
directly on the amount paid in), reduction of stimuli
for early retirement, and through bye-laws and better
organisation an endeavour to improve the collection
and the control of the collection of contributions from
the private sector.
Irrespective of well-grounded criticisms (that pension
reform should be done when a developed capital mar-
ket, a security and bond market, a financial market, a
banking system and a labour market exist in the Croa-
tian economy; that the basic shortcoming of the pro-
posal of the new Croatian law about the retirement
pension system is that it is not detailed enough in its
regulation of the question of how and where the sums
collected will be kept and made to bear interest; the
question of improvement of the collection and control
of the collection of contributions, and the possibility
of further overburdening of the national Budget - de-
tailed calculations for every foreseeable possibility, in
terms of amounts, years and so on) retirement reform
is essential and cannot be put off. On the other hand,
detailed consideration of the impact of the pension
system on the Budget is necessary so that long-term
reliable figures can be obtained for setting the new
system in a realistic budgetary framework.  In addi-
tion, it is necessary to attempt to evaluate transition
costs, study the consequences of changes on given age
groups and coordinate pension reform with reform of
the whole welfare system so that it should not happen
that certain clients simply drop out of the system alto-
gether.
Reform of the pension system is not a simple or easy
task that can be accomplished overnight.  Reforms
that include cost restrictions are particularly difficult
and need a lot of time, they mean going against cer-
tain people’s interests, and today’s forms of insurance
have practically become sacrosanct.  In Croatia it is
necessary to achieve a kind of national consensus
about the basic elements of the reform. It is also nec-
essary to carry out an effective public information
campaign so that the general public should be aware
of the reasons behind the reform, in order to reduce
the resistance that will inevitably come in the wake of
such wide-ranging reforms.
6.4 Health insurance and the financing of
health care
Basics
Health care is an expensive institution and activity
that is aimed at preserving and improving health.
Health protection is a wider concept than health care,
because the system of health protection, apart from all
the activities of the healthcare institutions, also in-
cludes other measures, aimed at preserving and im-
proving health.
The system of financing health protection is a set of
principles, regulations, mechanisms, instruments and
methods through which the process of gathering the
resources of health insurance and other resources of
health protection goes on, as well as their distribution
to those who provide health protection services. The
system of financing health protection is made up of:
sources of funds for financing health protection; in-
struments and methods for gathering resources from
these sources; instruments and methods for allocating
the resources that have been collected; and methods of
paying those who give the services.
The market for healthcare services and insurance can
be inefficient because of weak information and prob-
lems of unsuitable choice and moral hazard related to
JQ
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health insurance.  In all countries, healthcare costs are
rising at a great rate.
Situation
In terms of the number of hospital beds per 100 000 of
the population, Croatia is at the level found in the
more developed European countries, somewhat less so
in terms of the number of physicians.  Croatia ear-
marks a large proportion of its GDP for health, and in
the early 1990s set aside the highest proportion of its
GDP (8.5%) in 75 countries considered.  In Croatia
about 1995 the proportion given for health care in-
creased to about 10.1% of GDP, which is just slightly
smaller than the share taken by health care in Ger-
many (10.5% of GDP).
In 1998, 4.6 million persons had health insurance (in-
cluding 1.4 million members of the active working
population, 160,000 active small farmers, 850,000
retirees, 200,000 unemployed and 1.8 million depend-
ents).
Reasons
Health care in Croatia is financed by a contribution of
9% on wages (paid by the employer) and 9% from
wages (paid by the employee), which means that the
overall rate of contribution from gross wages is 18%.
These resources are collected in the Croatian Health
Insurance Institute. However, the money is not
enough to cover all the needs, and frequently it is im-
possible actually to obtain services that are theoreti-
cally available under health insurance. Difficulties
with financing the health service have been going on
for quite some time, and have been exacerbated since
1995, since which time spending in the health service
has not been matched by appropriate revenue. Al-
though the revenue of the CHII has been on the rise
since 1996, that year ended with the Institute still
owing almost a billion kuna, 1997 with debts of 2.25
billion kuna, and 1998 with over 3.76 billion kuna
worth of debts. The reasons are the reduction in the
number of active working people, insureds, and a rise
in the number of retirees (who from February 1 1998
stopped paying any kind of contribution for health
insurance whatsoever), a large nominal rise in expen-
diture for wages (in line with the collective agreement
made in the health service, every pay rise for people
whose pay comes out of the Budget automatically
means a pay rise for healthcare workers), and the in-
troduction of VAT (which cost the CHII about a bil-
lion kuna a year, with the proviso that a certain ad-
justment was made when VAT on medicines and im-
plants was abolished, but only to the extent of about
330 000 kuna).
Recommendations
In order to rationalise costs and improve the overall
healthcare situation in Croatia, a reform of the health
service is expected.  It is proposed that the present
system of financing almost all the health service with
money that is obtained from the 18% contribution
from wages will be abolished, and that there will be
three sources of resources for the medical service:
The first source would be contributions, to be reduced
to 10% from the present 18%.  This would lighten the
load on the economy and lower the cost of labour.  Of
the 13 billion that the healthcare budget is expected to
come to in 2000, this compulsory insurance would
provide 5 billion kuna.  The national Budget would
also, according to current proposals, finance health
care for groups at risk (children, the elderly, the un-
employed and the uninsured), finance public health
(epidemiology, the toxicity prevention service, radia-
tion contamination prevention and so on), and every-
thing that relates to preventive medicine and the pro-
motion of good health.  The third source of money
would be additional or topping-up insurance, in which
it is estimated that about 1.5 billion kuna would be
raised to be used for all diagnostic and therapeutic
services that are not provided by the national health
service.  The financial plan also includes money ob-
tained from participation by insureds, which accord-
ing to the current proposal would come to about 10%
of the price of medical services (in the current system
participation is about 1%, whereas in all European
countries it is between 5 and 15%); in addition there
would be a means test, which would make sure that
some would not pay the participation.  With this par-
ticipation, and the money with which the cities and
communes would co-finance their own medical insti-
tutions, another 1.5 billion kuna would find its way
into the system.
Among the basic conditions for the creation of this
new model of financing health protection is a precise
determination of a schedule of diagnostic and thera-
peutic services that the patient would be guaranteed
by the mandatory insurance.  The first packet of
obligatory services would include all that directly
saves lives and forms part of the emergency services,
primary health care and preventive measures.  All
other health care services not on this list or for a
higher standard of hospital care will have to be fi-
nanced from the additional insurance.
There are many advantages of the new model of fi-
nancing health care.  Because of the small contribu-
tions, labour costs should be reduced, which will in-
crease the competitiveness of the Croatian economy.
At the same time, citizens will be able to be directly
involved in the purchase of quality medical services.
To reduce spending in health care it is necessary to
check on and control all operations, and diagnostic
and therapeutic services, to make sure of their real
necessity. Thus it is necessary to make an integrated
system of cost lists, which would include five impor-
tant categories: hospitals, prescription drugs, diagnos-
tic procedures, the costs of treatment, and the costs of
treatment at home.  Apart from the reform of the fi-
nancing of the health service, it is also important to
design a successful national information strategy, to
facilitate data exchange and appropriate evaluation of
the quality of the health service in individual
healthcare establishments, supervision of the effi-
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ciency and financial justifiability of healthcare em-
ployees. Although reform of the health service and
health insurance is not a simple or cheap task (the
costs are estimated at some 40 million dollars), there
are many advantages to be gained from it in the im-
provement of health and the health service, and the
costs incurred should be far smaller than the savings
made later on.
Reform of the existing system of health insurance,
going in the direction of a greater reliance on private
insurance and an increase of market elements, is nec-
essary for the long-term viability of the system.  This
will reduce the excessive role of the state thus at once
restricting the opportunities for paternalist patterns of
behaviour and creating the conditions for a rise in in-
comes.
